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INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that corporations have existed for centuries in one
form or another, broadly acceptable answers to some of the most fundamental questions of corporate law and theory continue to elude us today.
Particularly in the case of widely held "public" corporations-in which the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. A.B., University of
Michigan; M.Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard Law School. For thoughtful comments and
suggestions, I would like to thank Stephen Bainbridge, Bryan Camp, William Casto, Susan Fortney,
Lyman Johnson, Dean Pawlowic, and David Skeel. Thanks also to the editors of the Alabama Law
Review for editorial assistance. Any errors are of course mine.
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sheer complexity of governance, production, and social impact arguably
exceeds the capacity of any single individual to comprehend it1theoretical uncertainties regarding the nature and purpose of the entity
remain exceptionally difficult to resolve in any comprehensive way. Who
possesses ultimate corporate governance authority? For whose benefit are
public corporations run? And what is corporate law's relationship to the
achievement of the social good? These are the questions with which this
Article will grapple.
Prevailing theories of corporate law have tended to advance strong
claims regarding the corporate governance primacy and legitimacy of either the board or the shareholders, as the case may be. In this Article, I
challenge the descriptive power of these theories and advance an alternative, arguing that corporate law is, and will remain, deeply ambivalentboth doctrinally and morally-with respect to each of three fundamental
and related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance authority,
the intended beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship
between corporate law and the achievement of the social good. I describe
corporate law as being "ambivalent" on each of these issues not to suggest
self-contradiction, but rather a pragmatic balancing of "two contrary or
parallel" sets of norms and interests in each case, 2 neither one of which
can be wholeheartedly endorsed in light of the numerous and complex
social and economic demands upon the modern public corporation.
Part I begins with a brief discussion of our long-standing misgivings
regarding the status of the corporation as an entity, arguing that concerns
regarding the potential negative consequences of permitting human beings
to act behind the veil of a distinct legal person are as old as the corporate
form itself. I then turn to an examination of the prevailing theories of corporate governance in Part II, arguing that they exhibit substantial shortcomings as descriptive theories due to their inability to account for the
fundamental elements of corporate law as it actually exists. Based upon a
re-examination of the roles and powers of shareholders and directors in the
1. This Article will focus on widely held public corporations, which raise the thorniest issues;
close corporations, and corporations with controlling shareholders, for which ownership and control
are largely synonymous, will not be addressed.
2.
The modern corporation has been described elsewhere as "schizophrenic," see William T.
Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOzo L. REV. 261, 261
(1992), though I prefer "ambivalent" for the reason set out above. The term "schizophrenic," used
colloquially, implies "mutually contradictory or inconsistent elements," whereas "ambivalent" can
connote a more complex relation among ostensibly disparate ideas, in the sense of "having either or
both of two contrary or parallel values, qualities or meanings." See OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONLINE, schizophrenic, a. and n. (2d ed. 1989); id. ambivalent, a. (emphasis added); see also William
T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1096 (2002) (describing Delaware law as "ambivalent" with respect to shareholder primacy). As I will argue below, corporate law is "ambivalent"-in
the sense of maintaining "two contrary or parallel values"-with respect to each of the three issues I
identify.
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public corporation across various doctrinal contexts, I conclude in Part III
that corporate law is, and will remain, fundamentally ambivalent. In so
doing I draw upon utilitarianism-corporate law's implicit moral theoryto more clearly describe the nature and degree of corporate law's commitment to shareholder wealth maximization. Its weak utilitarian commitment to shareholder wealth maximization, I argue, reflects real, but incomplete, confidence in the consistency of shareholders' incentives and
interests with those of the larger public-an uncertainty reinforced by the
corporate form's lack of legitimacy or practical ability to articulate an authoritative conception of the "social good."
I then turn to the rise of institutional shareholders in part IV, assessing
their effects on the issues discussed in this Article. Finally, in Part V I
offer some brief reflections on the implications of my analysis for an important doctrinal debate cutting to the heart of corporate governance: the
scope of the shareholders' authority to enact bylaws affecting the "business" and "affairs" of the corporation. Ultimately I suggest that corporate
law's fundamental ambivalence represents a keen awareness of the limitations and pitfalls inevitably attendant upon this mode of human organization, and that awareness of this core characteristic ought to be brought to
bear upon the corporate governance debate.
I.

THE CORPORATE SOUL

For the early seventeenth century jurist Sir Edward Coke, the law of
corporations flowed naturally from the fundamental nature of the corporate
entity itself. In his famous report on The Case of Sutton's Hospital, published in 1614, Coke explained that "a corporation aggregate of many is
invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law."' As an aggregation of real people into a single artificial legal person, the corporation met the need for a mechanism capable of ensuring the
continuity of a given institution or enterprise for an indefinite time, notwithstanding the mortality of its constituents.4 As the eighteenth century
jurist Sir William Blackstone would express it, the corporation's constituents-past, present, and future-became "but one person in law, a person
that never dies: in like manner as the river Thames is still the same river,
though the parts which compose it are changing every instant." 5 Black3.

EDWARD COKE, 5 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. IN THIRTEEN PARTS pt. X, at

*32b (photo. reprint 2002) (1826). The tenth part of Coke's Reports was originally published in 1614.
See Steve Sheppard, Coke's Reports: An Introduction to the 1826 Edition, in 1 COKE, supra, at xi.
4.
See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *455. This account of the origin of the
corporation is not specific to English common law. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 156-58 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Reinstein trans., Simon
and Schuster 1967) (1925) (providing a similar explanation for the advent of legal entities on the
Continent).
5.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *456.
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stone's contemporary, Sir Matthew Bacon, similarly employed the metaphor of the "Body Politick," the "Ligaments of which . . . are the Franchises and Liberties thereof, which bind and unite all its members together; and the whole Frame and Essence of the Corporation consist
therein. "6
What corporations could and could not do in seventeenth and eighteenth century England, then, was thought to turn directly on the qualities
that distinguished them from their flesh-and-blood constituents-notably
that they possessed neither bodies nor souls. 7 The passage from Coke
quoted above, for example, goes on to explain that corporations "cannot
commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no
souls."8 Neither could they "appear in person, but by attorney," nor "do
fealty, for an invisible body can neither be in person, nor swear. "9 Blackstone similarly observed that corporations "can neither maintain, or be
made defendant to, an action of battery or such like personal injuries; for a
corporation can neither beat, nor be beaten, in it's body politic." 10 Likewise it "cannot be executor or administrator, or perform any personal duties; for it cannot take an oath for the due execution of the office"-and so
forth in this manner of reasoning from the corporation's artificial nature. 1
Speaking from the twentieth century jurisprudential point of view,
H.L.A. Hart was clearly right to criticize the circularity of the old "fiction
theory" of the corporation, which purported to "deduce" its capacities
from conclusory statements about its inherent characteristics. 2 For Hart,
the ontology was considerably simpler; we make the rules, and it is only
by reference to those rules that the corporation can be said to "be" anything at all.13 Perhaps the more interesting aspect of the writings of Hart's
English forbears, however, is the simple fact that they felt the ontology of
the corporation to be something that needed to be reckoned with. Numerous references to corporations lacking "souls," "bodies," and so forth,
reflect an abiding puzzlement regarding the nature of the corporate enterprise, as well as its relationship to and effect upon its constituents.14 Critically, why presume that corporations "have no souls," as Coke did? In a
sense, this is a strange spiritual arithmetic: an aggregation of souls equals
no soul. Why not conclude that the corporation possesses at least the sum
6.
7.
8.
9.

MATTHEW BACON, 1 A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW *499-500.

COKE, supra note 3,at *32b.

Id.
Id. Fealty isdefined as "the allegiance thata tenant or vassal owes to a lord" under feudal

law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 642 (8th ed. 2004).
10.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *464.
11.
Id. at *464; see also BACON, supra note 6, at *506-09.
12.
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 44-47 (1983).

13.
Id. at 23, 30, 39; see also Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of CorporateLaw,
50 WASH.& LEE L. REv. 1565, 1571-74 (1993).
14.
See e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 4,at*464; COKE, supra note 3,at*32b.
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of its souls, or better yet, a sort of "super-soul" greater than the sum (especially where the stated aim of the collective effort was charitable or humanitarian in nature)?15 Put differently, why deny the humanity of what is,

in essence, a collection of human actors?
This critical premise of the old English law arguably reflects deep misgivings about permitting real people-presumed to possess minds and
souls guiding their actions-to organize themselves and act collectively
behind the veil of a separate and distinct entity. There is an uneasiness,
both ontological and moral, and perhaps even a certain creepiness, in such
descriptions of the corporation. Indeed, the implication is that collective
actions through these unnatural aggregations might differ markedly from
the sum of the actions the individuals in question might have taken under
the same circumstances. It is as if we were somehow meddling with the
forces of nature, constructing and unleashing upon the world a sort of legal Frankenstein (composed of us, mind you), the capabilities and moral
sensibilities of which could not be discerned, and the consequences of
which could prove difficult to predict and contain.
Though we no longer think about corporate powers and capacities in
such terms, and conceding that the entities that writers like Coke, Blackstone, and Bacon described as "corporations" bear only limited resemblance to the modern business corporation, such misgivings about distinct
collective entities taking on lives of their own are hardly a thing of the
distant past or foreign to American law. 6 The advent of general incorporation laws, limited liability for investors, free transferability of shares, and

15.
In Blackstone's time corporations in fact took many forms, with important distinctions including those between "aggregate" and "sole" (the latter consisting of offices), "ecclesiastical" and "lay,"
as well as "civil" and "eleemosynary." See BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *457-59. It is corporations
aggregate that are relevant to this discussion.
16.
The mode of reasoning ascribed to these English commentators clearly carries over into early
American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bank of Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834)
(finding that a corporation cannot "be compelled to work on the highways" in part because it "has no
corporeal body," is "incapable of performing labor, and therefore can not [sic] be compelled to perform an impossibility"). Early American cases involving corporations in fact note the lack of "body"
and "soul" (discussing the views of Coke and Blackstone) in casting aspersion on corporations' regard
for the social good. See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 43 (N.Y.
1837) ("Though corporations have no consciences, nor souls to commiserate the condition of others;
though they are not far-famed for a ready willingness to dispense justice to those who may have claims
upon their coffers, yet they are proverbial for their keenness and sagacity in amassing wealth, and not
too unfrequently at the expense of others."); see also Trs. of the Antipoeda Baptist Church v. Mulford, 8 N.J.L. 182, 191-92 (N.J. 1825) (responding to Coke's statement that corporations lack souls,
and Blackstone's statement that they lack bodies, in deciding that "assumpsit will lie against a corporation on an implied promise without the corporate seal"-an exception from the "general rule," attributed to Blackstone, motivated by concern that "corporations are now so multiplied that if they were
not amenable to justice in some cases like natural persons ... society could not tolerate the frauds in
business that they would have the ability to commit"). For a nuanced discussion of Blackstone's influence on early American law, politics, and legal education, see generally Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 731
(1976).
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the centralization of decision-making authority in the mid-nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries17 were not without controversy. Indeed, corporations were frequently referred to as "soulless" in nineteenth century debates over the future of the corporate form, reflecting concerns that they
"could concentrate the worst urges of whole groups of men; the economic
power of a corporation would not be tempered by the mentality of any one

man, or by considerations of family or morality." 18 And as noteworthy
scholars and jurists of the early twentieth century would observe of the
emergence of "public" corporations-so called because they relied on

enormous offerings of securities to an investing public to finance the capital-intensive projects of the industrial age"-"ownership" of these entities2" seemed to have been severed from any effective means of controlling

them.
By 1915, Louis Brandeis had concluded that public corporations were

"not controlled through a majority of the stock," but rather "very largely

by position," which he considered "an almost inevitable result of the wide
distribution of stock."2 1 Brandeis explained that "a wide distribution of the
stock dissipates altogether the responsibility of stockholders, particularly
of those with 5 shares, 10 shares, 15 shares, or 50 shares. They recognize
that they have no influence in a corporation of hundreds of millions of
dollars capital," and thus "consider it immaterial whatever they do, or

17.
For accounts of the emergence of these core characteristics of the modern U.S. business
corporation, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 83-109 (2d ed. 2007).
18.
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733,
797-98 (2005) (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 171-72 (2d ed.
1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not to suggest, however, that evaluation of the moral
dimensions of the modern business corporation has ever been a straightforward exercise. See, e.g.,
David A. Skeel, Jr., Christianity and the Large Scale Corporation6-13 (University of Pennsylvania
Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 07-45, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1025959 (discussing the range of Christian responses to the emergence of
modern corporate characteristics in nineteenth century England and the United States).
19.
A quintessential example was the emergence of the railroads, which catalyzed the development
of global bond markets and credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, which
initially rated only railroad debt. See Christopher M. Bruner & Rawi Abdelal, To Judge Leviathan:
Sovereign Credit Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y 191, 194 (2005).
Today, of course, terms such as "public corporation" and "public company" more specifically denote
having registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933
in order to sell securities publicly, or having otherwise triggered disclosure obligations under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 158-60 (2005).
20.
By "ownership" these writers referred to the rights of equity holders. Challenges to this characterization are discussed below. See infra notes 63-64 and 120 and accompanying text.
21.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, On Industrial Relations, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 70, 77 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1965) (testimony before the United
States Commission on Industrial Relations, January 23, 1915).
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22
omit to do"
-a phenomenon that economists would come to call "rational
23
"
apathy.
The definitive case for this view appeared with the 1932 publication
by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means of The Modem Corporation and
PrivateProperty, where they famously termed this development the "separation of ownership and control" 24 (certainly one of the most widely cited
works, and turns of phrase, in the literature) 25 . Justice Brandeis, in 1933,
built on the empirical case they set out, deriding acceptance of "the evils
attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate mechanism"
following the advent of general incorporation statutes, "as if these evils
were the inescapable price of civilized life and, hence, to be borne with
resignation. "26 In his view, availability of the corporate form for general
business purposes had been restricted for centuries "because of fear."27
Brandeis detected in the history "a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by corporations," and interpreted the advent of general incorporation as a rejection of
"favoritism" rather than an indication "that the apprehension of corporate
domination had been overcome. ,28 Observing the size to which corporations had grown, as well as their social and economic significance (and
citing to Berle and Means' work) Brandeis argued that the separation of
ownership and control had "removed many of the checks which formerly
operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power."2 9

22.
Id. As Stephen Bainbridge has observed, recognition of the separation of ownership and control in fact dates back at least to the late nineteenth century. See Stephen Bainbridge, Cook's The
Corporation
Problem:
There is Nothing New
Under the Corporate Law Sun,
BUSINESSASSOCIATIONSBLOG.COM,
July
31,
2007,
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/cooks-the corporation_problem_
there is nothing new_under_thecorporate law-/ (dating this recognition to the early 1890s).
23.
See, e.g., ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 178.
24.
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 5 (1932).

25.
As of June 25, 2007, searches of Lexis' "US & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined" database
for the phrases "modem corporation and private property" and "separation of ownership and control"
returned 920 and 1,061 results, respectively. For a discussion of historical trends resulting in the
separation of ownership and control in early twentieth century public corporations, see Dalia Tsuk
Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1503, 1519-24 (2006).
26.
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 549.
29.
Id. at 564-65. See also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, ShareholderPrimacy's
CorporatistOrigins: Adolf Berle and The Modem Corporation 12 (Institute for Law & Economics,
University of Pennsylvania Law School Research Paper No. 07-24, Georgetown Law Center Business,
Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 1021273, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1021273 (indicating that Berle and Brandeis were in contact by 1932). It
should be observed that Brandeis advocated disclosure not only to facilitate regulatory responses to
manipulative market practices, but also as a means of enabling shareholders to impose discipline upon
those controlling corporations. See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1518-19.
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Such descriptions of the modem public corporation reflect deep misgivings about the corporate form not unlike those identified in Coke's and
Blackstone's writings. References to "absentee owners," "absentee stockholders," "absentee landlords, "30 and the like often appeared in arguments
that corporations were not sufficiently answerable to the public, be they
consumers, employees, or communities, over whom they held enormous
sway-and that stockholders were effectively enabling their activities by
financing them, without accepting responsibility to monitor how, and to
what ends, their money was being used. Merrick Dodd, in an influential
1932 article for the HarvardLaw Review, characterized the separation of
ownership and control primarily as a sort of ethical fragmentation, exemplified by shareholders deemed (by custom) to "own" something for which
they accepted no responsibility, while corporate insiders were driven by
fiduciary duties to pursue the maximization of profit to the exclusion of
the interests of the public whose laws permitted the corporation to exist in
the first place.3 1 As Dodd saw it, the view that shareholder wealth maximization represents the principal goal of the corporation "means in practice that there are no human beings who are in a position where they can
lawfully accept for incorporated business those social responsibilities
which public opinion is coming to expect, and that these responsibilities
must be imposed on corporations by legal compulsion." 32 It appeared as if
each of what I will call the principal "power constituencies" within the
public corporation-the board33 and the shareholders-had ethical blinders
placed over their eyes by the corporate structure itself, the former by fiduciary duties and the latter by rational apathy.
Concerns regarding the capacity of public corporations to conduct
themselves consistent with the social good were widespread at the time of
the Great Depression. However, it was far less clear what corporate law
itself could or should do in response. For Dodd, the answer lay in remaining responsive to "public opinion, which ultimately makes law." 3 4 Dodd
observed that business leaders felt, or at least said, that their responsibilities were broader than the maximization of shareholder wealth, and in this
30.
See, e.g., BRANDEIS, supra note 21, at 74, 77 ("absentee stockholdings" and "absentee landlordism"); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv.
1145, 1153 (1932) ("absentee owners").
31.
See Dodd, supra note 30, at 1160-63.
32.
Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
33.
While large public corporations are, as a day-to-day matter, in fact run by officers-primarily
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-I focus instead on the board as the body possessing actual statutory authority over the business and affairs of corporations. It should be observed that corporate statutes generally do not even mention the position of CEO, reflecting the fact that, notwithstanding practical problems faced by part-time directors in monitoring the activities of full-time officers, corporate
officers' formal management authority is in fact derivative of the board's statutory mandate. See
ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 103-07. My interest here being the fundamental fonts of power in corporate law, I therefore focus on the board and the shareholders.
34.
See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 30, at 1148, 1153, 1161.
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light Dodd argued that the answer lay in fiduciary duties flowing not
merely to shareholders, but to the corporate entity itself-a move permitting corporations to be run "with a sense of social responsibility without
[boards and managers] thereby being guilty of a breach of trust." 35 Meanwhile, Adolph Berle, in a reply to Dodd, echoed his misgivings regarding
the separation of ownership and control but worried that fiduciary accountability to multiple corporate constituencies on an equal footing would
in practice mean accountability to none of them. 36 This, Berle argued,
would simply enhance the power of corporate insiders and render them
even less responsive to the public interest than they already were.37
This exchange framed a debate over the regulation of corporate governance that continues to animate corporate law scholarship and jurisprudence today .38 Despite-or perhaps because of-the evolution of the corporation into the most consequential form of economic actor on the planet,
uncertainties and misgivings about the moral capacities and social impacts
of the corporation remain. Einer Elhauge, for example, has questioned the
capacity of dispersed shareholders to engage in meaningful ethical assessment of corporate production at all." The structure of the public corporation "insulates . . . shareholders from social and moral sanctions and
processes," both by rendering them "largely anonymous" to the public, as
well as by virtue of their "relative lack of information about how corporate operations may impact the public interest." 40 Consequently, he argues, shareholders could push all that much harder for profit maximization
"untempered by social consequences," and a management team focused on
their interests would indeed render the corporation "soulless" for lack of
the "social and moral processes" that constrain individuals acting on their
own.4 Such concerns have taken on far greater urgency since the advent
35.
Id. at 1161-63.
36.
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365,
1368-72 (1932).
Id.
37.
38.
This said, as William Bratton and Michael Wachter point out, the Berle-Dodd debate differs
markedly from the contemporary corporate governance debate in that both Berle and Dodd broadly
accepted the prevailing "corporatism" of the day, under which "the corporation [was viewed] as an
entity that operates as an organ of the state and assumes social responsibilities." Bratton & Wachter,
supra note 29, at 6. Though Berle is often presented as "the supporter of modern shareholder primacy," and Dodd is often "interpreted in modem terms as a supporter of corporate social responsibility," Bratton and Wachter argue that "neither was supporting either position." Rather, "[b]oth were
speaking to the politics of their day, defending different visions of the emerging corporatist state." Id.
at 40-41.
39.
Elhauge, supra note 18, at 796-99.
Id. at 798.
40.
Id. at 799; cf. id. at 792-93 (observing that while a small percentage of investors invest in
41.
socially conscious funds," political polls evidence strong support for consideration of other constituencies in corporate decision-making). Others have voiced similar concerns and advanced similar arguments. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Saving the World With CorporateLaw? 10-11 (Boston Coll. Law
Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 130, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242
("As an artificial entity, [the corporation] has no conscience of its own. And with the separation be-
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of leveraged hostile tender offers in the 1980s, tempting shareholders with
all-cash premium deals, while arguably leaving other stakeholders (including employees, creditors, and communities) to bear the costs as the acquired companies labored under high debt loads or were simply broken up
to pay off the buyer's debts.42 The rise of institutional investors like hedge
funds-short-term investors more than happy to see companies take on
substantial debt to fund dividend payments for the benefit of shareholders-have raised similar concerns.43
Simply observing such phenomena, however, does not answer the
questions addressed in this Article, any more than it did in the day of
Berle and Dodd. Again, who possesses ultimate corporate governance
authority? For whose benefit are public corporations run? And what is
corporate law's relationship to the achievement of the social good? Daniel
Fischel, an influential proponent of the application of economic analysis to
law, has similarly observed that, as "a legal fiction, a corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the same way that
inanimate objects are incapable of having these obligations," but argued
on this basis that corporate law is simply powerless to mandate the pursuit
of anything other than shareholder wealth maximization.' 4 For Fischel and
others sharing this view, the best we can do is to try to contain corporate
activity by legal means external to corporate law itself, notably by contract
where possible and by regulatory laws where necessary.45 Others, however, have emphasized that the all-important business judgment rule,
which insulates the vast majority of business decisions from secondguessing by courts, already gives boards and managers (so inclined) substantial latitude to deviate from shareholder wealth maximization, so long
as they are not blunt about it.' In this light, we encounter a puzzling ambiguity at the very heart of corporate law and corporate governance: corporate law cannot force boards to advance the interests of nonshareholders, but neither can it generally prevent them from doing so."

tween the company and its investors, the conscience of those investors are not easily brought to

bear.-).
42.
See, e.g., DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 660 (3d ed. 2005);
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

34-37, 46-54 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988); see also infra

Subpart IlI.A.
43.
See infra Subpart IV.C.
44.
See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273
(1982).
45.
See, e.g., id. at 1269-71; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS
421-29 (2002); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 37-39 (1991).
46.
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-305 (1999).
47.
See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 810-14.
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As we will see, to the extent the corporation can be said to possess a
"soul," it lies in our collective capacity to grapple with such fundamental
tensions as these.
II. PREVAILING THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporate statutes and case law offer ample fodder for a range of
views on the appropriate balance of board and shareholder power and accountability, and which of these power constituencies ultimately holds the
upper hand is far from obvious. In Delaware (the jurisdiction of incorporation for most public companies in the United States)48 , the General Corporation Law (DGCL) gives boards sweeping authority to govern the "business and affairs of every corporation. "" There are few decisions of any
significance to the corporation that shareholders can take without the
board's approval.5 0 As Stephen Bainbridge aptly put it, in general "the
board acts and shareholders, at most, react," 5 ' leaving shareholders dissatisfied with firm governance with no (low-cost) option other than to sell
their stock-the so-called "'Wall Street' Rule." 52 Yet, it is the shareholders who, under the statute, are granted the power to elect the board in the
first place.53 Thus, it is the shareholders to whom directors are ultimately
answerable for their jobs-a reality leading one Delaware jurist to describe
the "shareholder franchise" as "the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests. "4 Moreover, the statute clearly
contemplates some shareholder involvement in corporate governance by
giving shareholders the unilateral right to "adopt, amend or repeal bylaws" relating to the corporation's "business" and "affairs" -a relatively
under-theorized form of authority teeing up a direct collision with the
48.
"More than 800,000 business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than
50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 60% of the Fortune 500." State of Delaware Division
of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your Corporate Home?, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/
(last visited Mar. 11, 2008). Consequently I will focus on Delaware law, though I will turn to the law
of other jurisdictions to illuminate discrete points throughout.
49.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
50.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(b), 251(b)-(c), 271(a) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (giving
shareholders the power to approve, but not initiate, amendments to the certificate of incorporation,
mergers, and sales of substantially all assets, respectively).
51.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REv.

601, 603 (2006).
52.
See id. at 619. Bainbridge further observes that board authority under state corporate law is
reinforced by federal securities law, which discourages accumulation of large blocks of stock through
the imposition of disclosure obligations, restrictive proxy rules, and the application of short-swing
profit rules. See id. at 617-19.
53.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001).
54.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.); see also
UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20,
2005) (Chandler, C.) ("[Tihe board's power ... derives from the shareholders, who are the ultimate
holders of power under Delaware law.").
55.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001).
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board's own explicit statutory authority to govern the corporation's opera-

tions .56
Similar ambiguities attend the issue of whose interests are to be advanced. It is often said that the aim of the corporation is shareholder
wealth maximization. 57 Yet, corporate statutes-even in Delawareexplicitly permit charitable donation of corporate assets, 58 and corporate
statutes and case law have, in certain circumstances (most notably in the
context of takeovers), explicitly endorsed the consideration of the interests
of non-shareholder constituencies,59 such as creditors, employees, and
local communities.
So whose interests are corporate decision-makers to pursue? And who
ultimately calls the shots? In the debate over the appropriate means and
ends of corporate law, three theories have gained substantial traction: the
"nexus of contracts" theory, the "team production" theory, and the
"shareholder primacy" theory.' In this Part I briefly canvas these theories
and the principal criticisms of them, and argue that each possesses only
limited descriptive power and ultimately fails to account for fundamental
elements of corporate law as it actually exists. Hence many of their principal claims remain, at best, normative and prescriptive aspirations.
A. Board-centricCorporate Governance
A number of prominent scholars have advanced theories of corporate
governance that emphasize the board's superior decision-making capacities. However, these theories differ markedly in the policy justifications
they offer for the primacy of boards in corporate governance, consequently advancing radically divergent claims regarding whose interests
corporations are built to serve.

56.
See infra Subpart III.B. and Part V.
57.
See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 439 (arguing that there is "no longer any
serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value").
58.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001); cf. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2) (2000) (permitting deduction of corporate charitable contributions up to 10 percent of taxable income).
59.
See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153-54 (Del. 1990);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (observing that "Unocal permits consideration of other corporate constituencies" in the takeover context so long as "there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders" and the independent existence of the corporation has not been abandoned).
60.
See infra Subparts ll.A. 1 (nexus of contracts theory), II.A.2 (team production theory), and
ll.B (shareholder primacy theory).
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1. Nexus of Contracts
Scholars associated with the "Law and Economics" movement generally view the corporation itself as a form of legal nexus through which
various stakeholders enter into the complex of essentially private contractual relationships through which corporate production occurs. According
to the classic statement of this "nexus of contracts" view of the corporation, set forth by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law,6 the claim is that while corporate stakeholders may never have actually negotiated the terms of their relationships, corporate law should-and typically does-arrive at what rational
stakeholders would agree to if they had. 62
Under this contractarian view of the corporation, shareholders cannot
be said to "own" the corporation, as such. While they certainly own a
claim to the corporation's residual profits and assets, they do not possess
the full range of entitlements with respect to the corporation that we typically associate with the concept of ownership, and in any event the concept
of ownership is simply inapposite to what is, on this view, just a legal
fiction permitting lower-cost contracting.63 Shareholders are, to be sure,
the primary beneficiaries of decision-making in the nexus-of-contracts
corporation, but only because rational investors, facing the prospect of a
mere residual claim, would demand both the right to elect the board and
fiduciary duties aligning the directors' interests with their own.' Deviations from shareholder wealth maximization remain permissible, but only
where agreed upon ahead of time.65
These scholars explain substantial limitations on shareholder voting by
reference to rational apathy and the heterogeneity of shareholders' interests,' and further point to the ability of shareholders to exert discipline
61.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 12.
62.
Id. at 14-15; see also Fischel, supra note 44, at 1261-65. Lyman Johnson observes that because "the positive and normative are largely congruent" in this formulation, "the need for legal
reforms and government regulation goes out the window." The characterization of corporate law "as
an adaptive, 'functional' response to social needs thus has an obvious conservative ideological thrust."
Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 2215, 2222 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991)).
See Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 604.
63.
64.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 36-39, 92-93; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 547, 577-85 (2003);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 441.
65.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 36. Investors in Ben & Jerry's, for example,
could not fairly complain about the effect upon profits of a corporate philanthropy program wellpublicized before the company went public because investors had the opportunity to bring the expectation of diminished future profits to bear upon the price they would pay for the stock in the offering.
See Michael S. Knoll, EthicalScreening in Modem FinancialMarkets: The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 Bus. LAW. 681, 720 (2002).
66.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 607, 623.
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through the sale of their stock in liquid capital markets, giving rise to a
"market for corporate control." 67 Under this view, shareholder noninvolvement in the corporation's governance is not merely an incident of
the structure of corporate law, but one of its defining and efficiencyenhancing features, leading one prominent scholar to go so far as to depict
the board as the very personification of the corporation itself-"a sui
generis body" serving as "a sort of Platonic guardian," deriving its legitimacy not from shareholder endorsement, but by virtue of serving as the
true nexus of contracts at the heart of the corporation.68
Other stakeholders, meanwhile, whose claims are not residual, and
therefore would not be expected to value voting rights and fiduciary protections so highly as the shareholders would, are deemed best protected by
contract where possible and external regulation where necessary. Socalled "social concerns" raised by corporate production are treated similarly. Thus employees, for example, are deemed capable of bargaining for
whatever protections they consider prudent in negotiating their employment agreements, and further enjoy the protections of labor laws; damage
to the environment can be minimized through regulation imposing the
costs of pollution on the corporation; and so on.69
While the nexus-of-contracts view provides a relatively solid theoretical description of board authority in the ordinary course of business for
large public corporations, it nevertheless has a difficult time accounting
for the law of corporate takeovers, and the absence of any clear mandate
to maximize the wealth of shareholders under any but the most limited
circumstances.7" As noted above, economically oriented scholars typically
argue that boards and management are adequately disciplined through the
market for corporate control-the viability of which depends critically on
the absence of substantial restraints on the transferability of shares-and
that this justifies weak (or nonexistent) shareholder voting rights with respect to the vast majority of corporate actions. The availability of antitakeover devices and statutes, however, tends to contradict this claim, as
67.
Id. at 614; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 45, at 70-71.
68.
Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 560. While built upon the contractarian view of the corporation
as a nexus of contracts, Stephen Bainbridge's "director primacy" theory advances the claim that it is in
fact the board of directors that constitutes the true nexus-a claim grounded in Ronald Coase's argument that the efficiency of firms resides in "command-and-control" governance structures eliminating
costs of bargaining in markets, and Kenneth Arrow's argument that "authority"-based decisionmaking
structures are superior to "consensus" procedures where stakeholders' interests and relative information differ. See id. at 554-59; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 779-84 (2006).
69.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 36-39; Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 587-91.
Some have advocated supplemental protection for tort victims (who neither compose an organized
group nor are capable of ex ante contracting) in the form of pro rata unlimited shareholder liability in
tort. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 466-67. However, such calls have not been embraced to date.
70.
See infra Subparts II.A.2 and III.A.
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Easterbrook and Fischel ultimately concede. 7' Poison pills7 2 and other defensive measures, they note, "give [managers] substantial control over

whether premium bids can succeed-that decrease the chance of receiving
a bid and may prevent success if it is made," 73 an opening seized upon by

advocates for robust shareholder involvement in corporate governance. 74
The very existence of any shareholder voting power inevitably proves
problematic for those who identify the board as the very essence of the
corporate enterprise. Bainbridge, for example, who depicts the board as a
"sui generis body"75 and "a sort of Platonic guardian, "76 justifies giving
voting power to shareholders by reference to the disciplinary effects of the

market for corporate control (made possible by the transferability of their
interests), but then proves amenable to "sharply constrain[ing]" the market
for control through takeover defenses in favor of the efficiency of board
governance 77-an account that undercuts its own explanation for the existence of even minimal shareholder voting rights.
Bainbridge responds that "shareholder voting is properly understood

not as an integral aspect of the corporate decision-making structure, but
rather as an accountability device of last resort to be used sparingly, at
best," and that corporate governance reflects the balancing of "two competing values"-"authority and accountability," which are "ultimately
irreconcilable."78 In the hostile tender offer context, then, Bainbridge acknowledges that takeover defenses cut against the disciplinary effects of
the market for corporate control, but nevertheless defends Delaware's
takeover jurisprudence as a "second best" solution on the logic that pre71.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 205-06.
72.
Poison pills, typically styled "shareholders' rights plans," provide a formidable defense
through dilution of the would-be hostile acquirer. Such plans generally work by attaching rights to
common stock pernitting the holder to buy deeply discounted shares in the event that someone crosses
a specified ownership threshold (often 15%) without the board's approval. Because the person triggering the rights is barred from exercising them, the effect of the poison pill is to dilute the holdings of
the would-be hostile acquirer. For a concise description of the evolution of such plans, see ALLEN,
KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 536-39.
73.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 205-06. See also Johnson, supra note 62, at
2245-46 (discussing this concession and observing that "[i]t is not often that halfway through a theoretical work the central thesis is undermined").
74.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675,
714-15 (2007).
75.
Bainbridge, supranote 64, at 560.
76.
Id.
77.
Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 614 and n.33, 628 and n.74. Note that Delaware has explicitly
rejected the characterization of directors as "Platonic masters" enjoying sui generis powers. See
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988). Note also that Bainbridge's
view on takeover defenses differs sharply from that of Easterbrook and Fischel. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
78.
Stephen Bainbridge, Bruner on Director Primacy and Other Pure Theories of Corporate
Governance,
BUSNEsSAsSOCIATIONSBLOG.COM,
Sept.
4,
2007,
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/commentslbruner-on-director_primacyand
_otherpure~theories of corporategovernance/ (commenting on the SSRN working paper version of
this Article, and quoting from Bainbridge, supranote 51, at 627).
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cluding such defenses would come at the cost of undermining board authority in other contexts, and ultimately sacrifice shareholder wealth.79 In

other words, jurisprudence endorsing powerful takeover defenses is "best
explained as implicitly concluding that the benefits of preserving authority
outweighs the costs of doing so." 80
This account is problematic, however, in at least a couple of respects.

Delaware's takeover jurisprudence is widely viewed as so very deferential
to the board that it substantially undercuts market-for-control based explanations for the existence of voting rightsS-a point that Bainbridge essentially concedes. As a consequence, then, one would have to have already
accepted the strongest claims of the director primacy theory (or something

very much like it) in order to accept the characterization of this jurisprudence as a "second best" approach. Indeed, more generally, stating the
core tension of corporate law as being between "authority" and "accountability" makes sense only if one has already accepted the strongest claims
of such a theory 82-that is, that boards stand at the core of the corporate
enterprise, that they wield sui generis powers (any deviation from which

can then only be characterized as an "accountability" mechanism, rather
than a legitimate exercise of "authority" in its own right), and that shareholder wealth maximization constitutes the defining goal of the corporation. However, Delaware courts quite clearly conceptualize board power
as resting upon a shareholder-granted mandate, rejecting the notion that
boards possess sui generis powers.83 The claim that shareholder wealth

maximization is the corporate end upon which the (hypothetically) negotiating parties would rationally agree is undercut by the fact that no state
statute explicitly mandates the maximization of shareholder wealth.'

79.
Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 827.
Id. at 827-28.
80.
81.
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 511, 514-16 (1997);
Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1564, 1572-73; Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New
Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEx. L. REV. 261, 280294 (2001); see also infra text accompanying notes 154-171.
82.
While I agree with Bainbridge that corporate law is characterized by tension between differing
fundamental principles and goals, I argue below that the core tension at the heart of corporate law
actually arises out of uncertainty about the compatibility of shareholders' interests and incentives with
the social good. See inifra Part III.
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.).
83.
84.
See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 738 ("None of the fifty states has a statute that imposes a duty
to profit-maximize or that makes profit-maximization the sole purpose of the corporation."). Although
Delaware case law mandates the maximization of the price received by shareholders once sale, breakup, or change of control of the company is "inevitable," see Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43, 46 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986), this is itself best understood as a deviation from the norm of
permitting de facto deviations from shareholder wealth maximization, a doctrinal move described
below by reference to the absence of any "long-term" stability interest to maintain once the company's
fate is sealed. See infra Subpart III.A.
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In fact, as described below, explicit endorsement of deviations from
shareholder wealth maximization are common both in takeover law and
with respect to charitable donations. Additionally, a growing body of
scholarship is exploring the degree to which the business judgment rule,
coupled with a focus on the firm's "long-term" prospects, provides boards
and managers with substantial discretion to deviate from the path of shareholder wealth maximization. 86 Whatever normative appeal such claims
may have as a matter of policy, they do not contribute to a compelling
descriptive theory of corporate law.
2. Team Production
An alternative model of corporate governance that has gained substantial traction over recent years is the "team production" theory developed
by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. This theory describes fundamental elements of corporate law as a means of coaxing various stakeholder groups
to make firm-specific investments in the corporation, notwithstanding the
vulnerability to opportunism by other stakeholders that such investments
inevitably involve.87
Blair and Stout define "team production" as "complex productive activity that requires multiple parties to make contributions that are to some
extent both team specific and unverifiable to an outside party," resulting in
"nonseparable" outputs that cannot be apportioned based on the parties'
relative contributions.88 Like the nexus-of-contracts view (and particularly
Stephen Bainbridge's "director primacy" variant), team-production theory
is highly board-centric with respect to governance authority, 89 although it
predicates this authority on a very different conception of the board's purpose, consequently arriving at a radically different conception of the ends
of corporate production. For Blair and Stout, the board acts as a "mediating hierarch," positioned and vested with the power to prevent other stakeholders from opportunistically exploiting one another. 90 The idea is that by
creating a mechanism for the prevention of opportunism ex post, stakeholders have sufficient assurance ex ante to be comfortable making such

85.
See infra Part III.
86.
See Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 778 and n.43 (acknowledging that other constituency statutes "qualify" the "shareholder wealth maximization norm by allowing the board to make trade-offs
between shareholder and stakeholder interests," and that "the business judgment rule effectively precludes courts from reviewing corporate decisions that allegedly further interests other than that of
shareholder wealth maximization").
87.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the
CorporateBoard, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 418-20 (2001).
88.
Id. at 419.
89.
See Bainbridge, supranote 64, at 551-52 (observing this similarity).
90.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 269-81; cf. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 42, at 37-41.
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investments in the first place.91 Reciprocally, then, the other parties"including shareholders, employees, and perhaps other stakeholders such
as creditors or the local community-enter into a 'pactum subjectionis'
under which they yield control over outputs and key inputs (time, intellectual skills, or financial capital) to the hierarchy" headed by the board.'
The team-production corporation thus appears quite similar to the nexus-of-contracts corporation in terms of governance authority, but the two
in fact differ enormously in that team-production theory rejects shareholder wealth maximization as the principal goal of the corporation. Instead, for the board effectively to manage opportunism among stakeholders, directors must be deemed "trustees for the corporation itself.'9
In support of this view of the role of the board, Blair and Stout observe
the lack of any clear articulation of a general duty to maximize profits in
corporate statutes and case law, as well as the substantial latitude that the
business judgment rule provides for boards to deviate from shareholder
wealth maximization-latitude that Blair and Stout argue is critical to the
board's capacity to manage tensions among stakeholder groups.94 This
room for maneuvering among the interests of various stakeholders, described by Blair and Stout as "play in the joints " 9 and by Einer Elhauge
as "agency slack," 9 6 is reinforced by courts' emphasis on the "long term"

interests of shareholders-which, among other things, can rhetorically
massage the sacrifice of shareholder wealth for the benefit of other constituencies.'
Through its emphasis on the interests of various stakeholders and the
degree of freedom boards possess to weigh those interests in the balance,
the team-production theory provides a good description of start-up and
91.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 269-81.
92.
Id. at 278. Note that even shareholders can be conceptualized as making firm-specific investments, notwithstanding ease of access to liquid capital markets, in that "when exploited shareholders
try to sell en masse the result is a predictable loss of market value." Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical
Benefits of ShareholderControl, 93 VA. L. REv. 789, 795 (2007).
93.
Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 281; see also Blair & Stout, supranote 87, at 424-25.
Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 299-309; cf. Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 437 (arguing
94.
that the relative unverifiability of inputs in the team-production corporation results in there being "no
way to set a substantive judicial standard for gauging how good a job the board is doing," hence the
business judgment rule); see also Elhauge, supra note 18, at 770-75; Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law,
Profit Maximization and the "Responsible Shareholder," 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 31, 44 (2005)
("In the final analysis, the debate is not so much about whether there should be limits on corporate
profit maximization as about what form the limits should take."); D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian
Potential of CorporateLaw 12-18 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1040,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=976742. Delaware describes the business judgment
rule as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
95.
Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 435.
96.
Elhauge, supra note 18, passim.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supranote 87, at 429.
97.
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certain initial public offering scenarios;98 stakeholder-oriented takeover
legislation and case law; and certain practical consequences of judicial

(non)review under the business judgment rule-all of which are elements
of corporate law that tend to elude the nexus-of-contracts theory.
The team-production theory itself falls short, however, of a complete
descriptive theory of corporate law. First, and perhaps most critically, as
David Millon has observed, for the board to function as an efficient mediating hierarch, corporate law would not merely have to permit deviations
from shareholder wealth maximization, but in fact would have to mandate
a stakeholder approach to prevent shareholder favoritism." As Millon puts
it, the "very discretion that allows corporate boards to pay attention to
nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests also allows them to pursue
shareholder value with relentless disregard for social costs"'°-an outcome inconsistent with Blair and Stout's account of the board's purpose.
As noted above, Blair and Stout argue that fiduciary duties are owed to the
firm as a whole, not just shareholders.' ° But this is no answer to Millon's
point that the board's dedication to its mediating hierarch role is no more
policeable under the business judgment rule than would be a duty to
maximize the wealth of shareholders. '0
Millon's point in fact takes on added force in light of substantial mar-

ket pressures to maximize current stock price. John Coates, for example,
notes that the mediating hierarch approach to corporate governance cannot
function where the board is dominated by any particular stakeholder (notably management or shareholders) and observes that despite its decline
since the 1980s takeover wave, the market for corporate control still exists
to some degree, and may be reinvigorated by institutional activism.' 03

98.
See, e.g., id. at 420-21 (employing the start-up example to illustrate team production dynamics); Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 281 (observing that "the choice to 'go public' may be driven in
part by team production considerations" where a closely held corporation controlled by an entrepreneur contemplates expansion requiring firm-specific investments by additional stakeholders). But see
John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy:How Contestable Are U.S. Public
Corporations?,24 J. CORP. L. 837, 863-64 (1999) (observing that while team production helps explain
cases in which previously concentrated control is immediately dispersed among IPO investors, most
IPOs do not in fact result in immediate dispersal of control in the market, leaving the post-IPO board
under the thumb of a controlling shareholder).
99.
David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production
Model of CorporateLaw, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1022 (2000).
100.
Id.; see also Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 730-31.
101.
Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 281.
102.
Millon, supranote 99, at 1022.
103.
See Coates, supra note 98, at 844, 859-60; Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1476 (2006) (arguing that the "hostile
takeover has to some extent been replaced by substantial equity investments through hedge or other
private equity funds," which have "added a significant disciplinary force"); Paul T. Schnell, Fending
off hostile activity now, NAT'L L.J., June 25, 2007, at Si (discussing the degree to which "activist"
shareholdings facilitate hostile takeover activity); see also Millon, supra note 99, at 1008, 1023 (arguing that, at most, the team production theory provides normative support for board independence).
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Blair and Stout, to be sure, acknowledge that their theory requires
board independence, and that directors do "remain subject to equity market pressures," due not only to the market for corporate control (whatever
its potency may be) but also to on-going financing needs and equity-based
compensation. 1" Their response is that the board need only "provide
enough of the firm's surplus to each residual claimant to keep her in the
corporate team," and that otherwise "who gets exactly what share of [any]
surplus will be determined by which groups best capture the board's attention, which groups argue most persuasively, and, perhaps, by what the
directors had for breakfast the morning of the board meeting."l"5 The response is inadequate, however, in so far as it simply assumes the happy
circumstance in which there is "enough" to satisfy all stakeholders. It is
precisely where this is not the case-the many circumstances where boards
face difficult, zero-sum distributional questions-where equity market
pressures become most relevant. In any event, like the nexus-of-contracts
theory-and particularly its "director primacy" variant- the teamproduction theory provides no compelling explanation whatever for the
existence of shareholders' statutory voting rights to elect the board,
which-by any rational interpretation-can only have been intended to
enhance the board's accountability to this single constituency. 106
Finally, Blair and Stout's emphasis on fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole fails to account for the general inability of nonshareholders to enforce them. Case law, at least in Delaware, has continually made clear that courts remain disinclined to extend fiduciary protections to non-shareholders in solvent firms. In Gheewalla, for example, the
Delaware Supreme Court in 2007 emphasized that "directors owe their
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders. " 1°7 While
creditors may have derivative standing with respect to duties owed the
corporation in insolvency (having replaced shareholders as the corporation's residual claimants), they do not enjoy such standing outside of that
context, and never have direct standing to sue for fiduciary breaches t °-a
cabining of non-shareholder fiduciary protections at odds with the mediating hierarch conception of the board's role. Blair and Stout have argued
that, as a practical matter, derivative standing rules limit such shareholderinitiated suits to those advancing the interests of all stakeholders." ° As
Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 435.
104.
Id. at 435-36 (emphasis added).
105.
106.
See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
107.
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del.
2007) (emphasis added).
Id. at 102-03 and n.43. while the Chancery Court had effectively expanded this concept to
108.
corporations "in the vicinity of insolvency," see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), the Gheewalla court flatly rejected that notion. See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 293.
109.
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Millon observes, however, there is "no duty to bring suit in cases in which
[shareholders] have no interest," and we could not reasonably expect them
to do so where "they stand to gain nothing from the exercise. "110
B. Shareholder-centricCorporateGovernance
Another theory of corporate governance, in stark contrast with those
considered above and premised largely on a property-based conception of
the corporation, takes a far more shareholder-centric view. Whereas other
theories of corporate governance query whether shareholders can sensibly
be called "owners" of the corporation, given the significant limits on their
control over corporate assets and the disputed nature of the corporation
itself, some scholars view the corporation as the shareholders' property,
and corporate governance as the hiring of help to administer it. "'
In the classic statement of this shareholder-primacy view, published in
the New York Times Magazine in 1970, economist Milton Friedman argued that "a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business," with "direct responsibility to his employers"-notably a "responsibility . . . to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to
the basic rules of the society. "112 Permitting corporate boards and manag-

ers to advance any other goal would simply confuse the employee for the
employer, and ought to be left to an institution with a legitimate mandate
to address "social" issues-namely the government." 3 Shareholder-centric
models of corporate governance have gained substantial traction in the
new millennium, with calls for accountability to shareholders animated
principally by dissatisfaction with perceived shirking and extraction of
private benefits by insiders," 4 particularly once the meltdown of Enron

and other notable bankruptcies called into question the efficacy
of existing
5
"
management.
and
boards
vis-A-vis
mechanisms
disciplinary
This view, like the nexus-of-contracts view, identifies the maximization of shareholder wealth as the proper metric of board performance and
corporate success," 6 but unlike both theories outlined above, articulates a
110.
Millon, supra note 99, at 1013.
Il1.
Observe that whether such models explicitly treat shareholders as "owners," or merely emphasize "principal-agent" and "agency cost" dynamics vis-t-vis an ownership interest in a residual
claim to corporate assets and profits, they nonetheless treat shareholders as "occupy[ing] a privileged
position with ownership-like rights." Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 563-64.
112.
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
Profits, N.Y. TImES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
113.
See id. at 122.
114.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supranote 74, at 678-82.
115.
See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REv. 561, 568-69 (2006); cf. Schnell, supra note 103.
116.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 678; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1615, 1645 (2005) (reviewing LuCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE
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robust conception of shareholders' power in corporate governance. Lucian
Bebchuk, for example, has emphasized that courts' willingness to abstain
from substantive review of board decisions under the business judgment
rule and to permit boards to block hostile tender offers has been premised
in part on the shareholders' "power to replace the board," and that the
practical significance of this capability is heightened by the shareholders'
inability to initiate fundamental transactions like mergers."' Under this
view, meaningful capability to elect and remove directors, above all else,
is necessary to reduce "agency costs" in what is typically conceptualized
as something akin to a principal-agent relationship' -"to provide directors with strong affirmative incentives to focus on shareholder interests."'1 9
Strictly speaking, it would be somewhat unfair to criticize current
shareholder-centric theories of corporate governance for their shortcomings as descriptive theories because many of their most important
claims are in fact explicitly prescriptive. 120 The most prominent among
them, Lucian Bebchuk's argument for the enablement of meaningful exercise of the shareholder franchise, readily acknowledges that the shareholder franchise remains in practical terms a "myth," and consciously
styles itself a reform package-that is, a normatively favorable means of
turning the myth "into a reality." 121 However, such calls for reform do
build upon readings of the statute and case law claimed to favor significant
shareholder involvement in corporate governance, thus making substantial
descriptive claims about corporate law that are open to evaluation.
As mentioned above, Bebchuk emphasizes that courts' willingness to
apply the deferential business judgment rule and to permit boards to impede tender offers has been premised in part on the shareholders' "power
to replace the board," a statutorily provided capability the significance of
which is heightened, he argues, by the shareholders' inability to initiate
fundamental transactions. 2 He also emphasizes judicial language grounding the legitimate exercise of board power in the mandate granted through

FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

(2004)) (observing that Bebchuk and Fried's shareholder primacy theory and Bainbridge's director
primacy theory similarly identify shareholder wealth maximization as "the proper decisionmaking
norm in corporate governance").
117.
See Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 680-81.
118.
See, e.g., id. at 679. But see ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 100-01,
105 (observing that unlike officers, directors are not ordinarily subject to the will of the majority of
shareholders and thus are not "agents" of the shareholders, strictly speaking).
119.
Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 682.
In any event, the property-oriented view that shareholders literally "own" the corporation
120.
itself has been compellingly refuted by nexus-of-contracts and team-production scholars alike. See
supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; Blair & Stout, supra note 46, at 259-61.
121.
See Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 677-79.
122.
See id. at 680-81.
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election by shareholders. 123 It should be observed, however, that
Bebchuk's specific reforms relate not to the fact of the shareholder franchise itself, but instead to how it is effectuated-involving both state corporate law and federal securities law reforms, and focusing on liberalization of the proxy voting system and a strong interpretation of shareholders'
bylaw authority. 124 And on this score-that is, the precise terms of govern-

ance within a given corporation-the situation remains a picture of perfect
ambiguity. As discussed below, the relationship between the shareholders'
authority to enact bylaws, on the one hand, and the board's broad authority to manage the business and affairs of the25corporation, on the other, is
left utterly unclear on the face of the statute. 1
Perhaps more importantly, the shareholder primacist's claim that the
purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth 26 encounters
the same descriptive problems that the nexus-of-contracts theory does: the
absence of any such general duty, the explicit endorsement of deviations
from it, and the relative insulation of tacit deviations from it under the
business judgment rule. While Bebchuk, for example, rightly observes that
the lack of a stakeholder mandate tends to contradict Blair and Stout's
mediating hierarch conception of the board, his response to the relative
insulation of boards from pressure to maximize shareholder wealth is primarily prescriptive, and he provides little evidence to support his claim
that "[s]tandard board practices do not generally reflect a 27conception of
boards as an agent for both stakeholders and shareholders. ,1
123.
See id. at 676 (citing Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(Allen, C.)). At the same time, however, Blasius' language regarding the shareholder franchise has
itself been characterized as double-edged, in that it can be read to suggest that the shareholders' role is
merely to legitimate board power. See Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1574.
124.
See Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 683-711. An interesting development in the debate over shareholder involvement in corporate governance has arisen with the adoption of the North Dakota Public
Company Act, which reads like a shareholder activist's wish list. See North Dakota Publicly Traded
Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-01 to -33 (Supp. 2007); Press Release, North Dakota
Corporate Governance Council, North Dakota Enacts First Shareholder Friendly Corporation Law
(Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.ndcgc.orglReference/2007.04.11Release.pdf; Anywhere but
Delaware,
EcONOMIST.COM,
Apr.
17,
2007,
http://www.econonist.com/business/displaystory.cfin?story_id =9028426&CFID = 1869686&CFTOK
EN=52050397. There is real reason to doubt, however, that such a statute could conceivably curtail
Delaware's dominance via shareholder pressure to adopt it-not least because Delaware's statute
already permits extraordinary latitude in terms of permissible governance structures, and corporations
and their shareholders seldom diverge from the default allocation of power. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The North Dakota Experiment: Bundle Up!, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE BLOG, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/26the-northdakota-experiment-bundle-up/.
125.
See infra Subpart III.B.1 and Part V. On the competing view of the policy merits, see, for
example, Stout, supra note 92, at 799-801, which questions the empirical evidence that easing removal
of directors would "improve corporate performance" in a piece responding to Bebchuk's reform proposals.
126.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 678.
127.
See id. at 731 (citing the prevalence of equity-based compensation); see also notes 100-106
and accompanying text.
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C. The State of Play
In sum, with respect to who holds the upper hand between the power
constituencies of the corporation, the three dominant theories outlined
above fall into two general camps-those premised on the board's authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation under DGCL §
141, and those premised on the board's accountability to the shareholders
who elect them under DGCL § 211. The former tend to emphasize the
functional decision-making superiority of the board structure, giving shortshrift to the shareholder franchise as a (statutorily recognized) source of
legitimacy, while the latter emphasize shareholder "ownership" type
claims and vulnerability to "agency" type problems, giving short-shrift to
the extraordinary limits the statutes place on shareholder voting, the pervasiveness of rational apathy in the capital markets, and the extraordinary
breadth of the statute's grant of power to the board.
In seeking to describe the corporate form, each of these theories ultimately advocates a particular model or vision of "pure" corporate governance that, for better or worse, cannot be squared with fundamental tenets
of corporate law as it in fact exists. The reason, I will argue in the next
part, is that corporate law is fundamentally ambivalent with respect to the
merits of board and shareholder power, respectively.128
III. CORPORATIONS, MARKETS, AND MORAL THEORY

Returning to Hart's observation that we cannot hope to describe what
the corporation "is" other than by reference to the legal rules that give rise
to and define its existence,' 29 it appears that each of the theories canvassed
in the preceding part exhibits substantial shortcomings as a descriptive
theory. Indeed, Hart further observes how easily theories of corporate
law-dealing with abstract legal entities lacking any "ordinary factual
counterparts" to gratify the desire for easy definition-end up morphing
into political claims regarding how and when certain types of rules or procedures ought to be applied. 3 ' This drama continues to play itself out in
the corporate governance debate today.

128.
As noted above, while the modem business corporation has been described elsewhere as
.schizophrenic," I prefer "ambivalent" for its connotation of a complex relation among ostensibly
disparate ideas, as opposed to self-contradiction. See supra note 2; see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine,
supra note 2, at 1067, 1096 (describing Delaware law as "ambivalent" with respect to shareholder
primacy, and observing that prevailing theories have been "content to advocate the pure form[s] of
[their] position[s]").
129.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; see also Orts, supra note 13, at 1571-74
(agreeing with Hart's observation that while "beginning study of [the corporation] by trying to define
it may sound like common sense," it is in fact "not amenable to this approach").
130.
See HART, supra note 12, at 25.
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And so we have three prevailing theories, each of which has "dealt
deadly blows to the other," as Hart might put it. 3' This part of the Article
explores the ambivalence of corporate law with respect to three central
issues and argues, contrary to the theories discussed above, that these
manifestations of ambivalence themselves constitute the essence of corporate law, reflecting our uneasiness about the utilitarian bargain often said
to underwrite it. First I will examine the doctrine in greater depth, focusing particularly on board power and the scope of the board's legal authority to deviate from the maximization of shareholder wealth. I will then
argue that corporate law remains ambivalent regarding its power constituencies, its beneficiaries, and its relationship to the social good, respectively-three reflections of corporate law's structure that I consider in turn
in order to illuminate the complex relationship between legal means and
social ends. In so doing I will draw upon utilitarianism, the implicit moral
theory of corporate law, to describe more fully the actual nature and degree of corporate law's commitment to shareholder wealth maximization,
and ultimately the social indeterminacy of the widely held public corporation.
A.

CorporatePowerand Shareholder Wealth

In the modern public corporation, as a practical matter, retail shareholders-by which I mean living, breathing, individual shareholdersgenerally hand over their money and then check Out. 1 32 The shareholders'
money finances, and thus enables, corporate production. But as a day-today matter, shareholders generally do not monitor corporate boards and
management in any meaningful sense due to rational apathy, limitations on
their ability to initiate corporate actions, and restrictive voting procedures, 133 among other things. Recall the early-twentieth century characterization of shareholders as "absentee owners" and the like. 134 There may be
good legal reason to query the characterization of shareholders as "owners" of the corporation, but there are no grounds for querying their characterization as "absentees." This, as we saw, struck scholars like Dodd as
giving rise to a troubling ethical fragmentation at the heart of the public
corporation; shareholders enable and profit from a form of production for

131.
Id. at 24.
132.
I describe here the typical investor holding a small amount of a public company's stock. The
role of institutional shareholders, including their impact on the situation I describe here with respect to
retail shareholders, is examined in Part IV.
133.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 603, 607, 616-19; Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 683-95
(highlighting the "considerable impediments to replacing boards").
134.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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which they accept no responsibility-an "anomalous" situation in the

law. 135
Shareholders in the modem public corporation place themselves in a
position in which virtually the only thing they can monitor with any efficacy is firm value, measured crudely by current stock price. In so doing
they place massive market pressure on corporate boards to enhance their
profits-even where those individual investors themselves, in the position36
1
of decision-maker, might have weighed other things into the balance.
They essentially enable corporate production by adopting a role that insu-

lates them from substantial psychological awareness of, or feeling of responsibility for, the social consequences of that production.' 37 Indeed, perhaps ironically, the very psychological dynamics that some have argued

can account for board performance (in the absence of strong liability rules)
reciprocally provide a compelling explanation for shareholders' moral
disengagement in public corporations. Blair and Stout, for example, report

that "trustworthy" conduct vis-A-vis some other person or group is associated, among other things, with proximity, group identity, and the capacity
for direct communications, which they argue help to explain faithful conduct on the part of fiduciaries like corporate directors.' 38 At the same time,
however, we should observe the degree to which these very factors rein-

force the disengagement of shareholders from the consequences of their
own investment decisions; shareholders generally neither see, identify, nor
communicate with, those affected by the corporate production they finance. Ian Lee has observed that "the geographic remoteness of the vic-

tims of corporate irresponsibility dulls our empathy in [the corporate] setting, while the opacity of the corporate world somehow tricks us into for-

getting that the corporation's activities are undertaken for our benefit as
shareholders"-dynamics to which Lee attributes what he calls the
"bounded empathy" of shareholders. 139

135.
Dodd, supra note 30, at 1162.
136.
See Lee, supra note 94, at 36-37.
137.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
138.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations
of CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1768-75, 1780-98 (2001). David Sally, based on a metaanalysis of 37 prisoners' and social dilemma studies, found that defection was more likely where the
temptation was great, the group size was large, and there was no money involved, whereas cooperation was more likely where participants could perceive that the group had much to gain through cooperation, they were instructed to cooperate, they could see the others, they could "select an affectively
named choice," and they could speak with the others. See David Sally, Conversationand Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments From 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y
58, 86-87 (1995). Interestingly, Sally also notes that economics students have been found less likely to
cooperate than psychology students in such studies. Id. at 63, 78.
139.
Lee, supra note 94, at 53; cf. Shleifer & Summers, supra note 42, at 37-43 (characterizing
shareholders' acceptance of hostile tender offers as a breach of "trust" and "implicit contracts" with
other stakeholders).
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Shareholders do, of course, have the capacity to take consequential action in certain extraordinary circumstances discussed below," 4° and shareholder conduct may, to be sure, redound to the benefit of other stakeholders in a given circumstance-say, in litigation targeting disloyal directors, or in acceptance of a takeover bid that would, in fact, result in abler
management. But as others have observed, this is largely a matter of coincidence. 141 Shareholders have no incentive to act in a manner beneficial to
other stakeholders absent some personal interest in a given matter, and of
course the shareholders' interests might well diverge from those of other
stakeholders. 142
. And what of the other power constituency-the board? The perspective
of the director is considerably more complex due to the interplay of market pressures, norms, and legal rules that affect how corporate directors
exercise the decision-making power granted them by corporate law. There
is clearly a general market understanding that directors labor to maximize
current stock price, and there is correspondingly strong equity market
pressure to do so. As a matter of corporate law, however, directors remain substantially unconstrained in this respect due to the protections of
the business judgment rule.
While the business judgment rule certainly performs a number of functions, including ensuring that candidates have adequate incentive to take
these jobs in the first place, notwithstanding the liability risks they would
otherwise face, 143 it also undoubtedly functions to reinforce the distancing
of shareholders from corporate production by rendering board decisionmaking all the more opaque. As the Delaware Supreme Court would explain in the midst of the Disney litigation regarding board approval of extraordinary pay and severance packages for former president Michael
Ovitz:
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise
"substantive due care," we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh
or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they
are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking
context is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of
the business judgment rule."

See infra Parts III-V.
See, e.g., Millon, supra note 99, at 1013.
Id.
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 98-100; Christopher M. Bruner, Good
State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1132-34 (2006).
144.
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). On the Disney litigation generally, see
140.
141.
142.
143.
Faith,
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While courts will inquire as to the adequacy of the process followed
by the board, the merits of the board's actual decision simply will not be
second-guessed. The board, in this respect, is quite literally a "black box"
in that its actual decision-making (as opposed to the formal procedures
followed) generally is not open to the scrutiny of shareholders, judges, or

anyone else. 145
Indeed, setting aside equity market pressures for the moment, the
outer limits that corporate law itself places upon the ability of boards to
deviate from the maximization of shareholder wealth are relatively ac-

commodating. They are, however, less than straightforward in their relation to one another. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, a visual representation is offered below (Figure 1), followed by an explanation of its components. In a nutshell, the board enjoys quite a range of discretion in day-today business matters, with considerable latitude to deviate (tacitly) from
shareholder wealth maximization. Such latitude is modified only in narrow
circumstances where the advancement of other stakeholders' interests is
clearly barred, or clearly endorsed, as the case may be.'46

Bruner, supra note 143, at 1153-54, 1162-73.
145.
An interesting expression of these dynamics is the heavy reliance that drafters of minutes place
upon the term "discussion ensued"-a perfect lawyerly blend of procedural specificity and substantive
opacity. As one practitioners' guide explains, "[a]lthough all actions should be recorded in the minutes, the discussion surrounding the proposal is often better left omitted from the official minutes.
Discussions that could potentially harm the interests of the company in the future should not be included." The corporate Secretary is urged to bear in mind that "the minutes will eventually constitute
legal evidence of the actions that occur at the meeting," and that "although the Secretary is required to
put together a true record of all of the corporate proceedings, she should take pains in drafting the
minutes... to eliminate any language that could potentially be harmful to the company in a dispute or
legal proceeding." Steven J. Gartner, Form of CorporateMinutes, 81 CoRP. PRAC. SERIES (BNA) All, A-12 (Aug. 2007). As of July 1, 2007, a Google search for the phrase "discussion ensued" with
the word "minutes" returned approximately 815,000 results.
146.
Note that Figure 1 does not reflect true final period situations, most notably the application of
Revlon duties where the sale, break-up, or change of control of the corporation has become "inevitable." On final period problems, see Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 789 ("In repeat transactions, the risk
of self-dealing by one party is constrained by the threat that the other party will punish the cheating
party in future transactions. In a final period transaction, this constraint-i.e., the threat of future
punishment--disappears because the final period transaction is the last in the series.").
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Figure 1. Deviations from Shareholder Wealth Maximization
(SWM) by Delaware Boards
To begin with the more straightforward, at one extreme we have "selfish" conduct by the director. Quintessential examples of selfish director
conduct include various forms of self-dealing, which obviously come at
the expense of shareholders (and other stakeholders). However, corporate
law reasonably conceptualizes "selfish" conduct more broadly as including
bad faith departures from the pursuit of the corporation's interestsbasically a form of shirking that also clearly hurts shareholders (and other
stakeholders), and which the Delaware Supreme Court has clarified constitutes a violation of the duty of loyalty. The archetypal statement of the
duty of loyalty was set forth in Guth v. Loft, in which the Delaware Supreme Court explained that:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.
While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to
the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to
his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would
work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to en-
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able it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. 147
The dual nature of loyalty described in Guth-requiring both refraining from harming the corporation and its shareholders, and affirmatively
working to advance their interests-was reinforced in Stone v. Ritter
where the court finally held that "good faith" constitutes a component of
loyalty. 48 So at this extreme of Figure 1, representing these differing
forms of "selfish" conduct by directors, we find that courts have explicitly
barred directors from advancing the relevant non-shareholder interests
(namely their own). The fact that interested and bad faith decisions explicitly are not protected by the business judgment rule,' 49 and that disloyal
and bad faith conduct explicitly are not protected by Delaware's director
exculpation statute,"' give this limitation real teeth.
At the other extreme, then, we have what I term "altruistic" director
conduct for the benefit of those typically lumped together as "other constituencies," such as creditors, employees, and broader communities. At
this end of the spectrum, deviations from shareholder wealth maximization
are clearly permitted, within constraints established by judicial interpretations of the corporate donation statute and takeover jurisprudence. DGCL
§ 122(9), for example, states that all corporations have the power to
"[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or
educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in
aid thereof."' .5 Interestingly, this statute includes no explicit limit on the
permissible scope of such donations, but courts interpreting the statute
have applied a test of "reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations

furnish a helpful guide. " 152

147.
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added).
148.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006); see also Bruner, supra note 143, at 117786 (arguing that good faith is best conceptualized as a subset of the duty of loyalty).
149.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
150.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). This section of the statute permits charter

provisions limiting or eliminating directors' monetary liability for breaches of the fiduciary duty of
care. See Bruner, supra note 143, at 1143-47.
151.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9).

152.
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); see also Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991); 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2) (2000) (permitting deduction of corporate charitable contributions up to 10% of taxable income). The adequacy of legal and market-based
constraints to contain corporate giving is evidenced by the fact that, notwithstanding such open grants
of power under the statutes, corporate donations have averaged just 1 to 1.3% of corporate income, as
compared with 1.9 to 2.2% for individuals. Elhauge, supra note 18, at 836-37. In A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, perhaps the best known case on corporate donations, the New Jersey Supreme Court took the view that modest corporate donations are generally consistent with the shareholders' own long-term interests, emphasizing that New Jersey's corporate donation statute simply
confirmed a power that already existed absent the statute. 98 A.2d 581, 584-86, 590 (N.J. 1953).
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Similarly, case law governing the board's response to a hostile takeover attempt explicitly permits consideration of the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, fixing the board's sights on the long-term in a
context in which shareholders' sights can be expected to fix squarely on
current stock price due to the lure of a premium bid. 53 Given the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests,
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders" when a hostile

bid arises (i.e., to preserve their jobs), the Delaware Supreme Court has,
since its 1985 Unocal opinion, applied "enhanced" scrutiny: the board in
effect must earn the protections of the business judgment rule by demonstrating that there were "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed," and that any defensive measures were "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."154 In so holding, the
court explained that the proportionality inquiry requires the board to assess
the effects of the bid on "the corporate enterprise," which analysis could
include "the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally). ,155
In general, the Unocal standard is not a terribly exacting one. 156 That
virtually any type of defensive measure can be deemed proportionate was
underscored in Moran, where the court held that a poison pill adopted

preemptively, in response to the generalized threat of coercive tender offers in the market place, passed muster under Unocal, given the availability of the proxy contest as a means of dislodging the board itself.157

Elhauge similarly notes that corporate donations can ultimately redound to the benefit of shareholders,
but observes that many early twentieth century cases had in fact held corporate donations to be ultra
vires where not explicitly permitted by the charter. Elhauge, supra note 18, at 830. This suggests that
the adoption of corporate donation statutes had less to do with long-term shareholder wealth maximization and more to do with enhancing management's ability to deviate from it, given management's
greater awareness of corporations' dependence and impact upon the communities surrounding them.
Id. at 830, 837-38.
153.
See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 954-55. The Delaware Supreme Court has subsequently clarified that proportionality
154.
review under the second step of the Unocal test requires assessing whether the defensive measure was
"preclusive" or "coercive," and if neither, whether it fell within a "range of reasonableness." Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995).
155.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Other states have in fact gone further, enacting statutes explicitly
endorsing the consideration of other constituencies as consistent with the discharge of fiduciary duties,
though, with a single exception, such statutes do not mandate that other constituencies be considered.
See infra note 186.
156.
Thompson and Smith attribute the weakness of Unocal and its progeny as a means of policing
the board to its reliance on fiduciary duties, requiring courts to "distinguish director-instituted takeover defenses that serve the interests of shareholders from those that merely entrench incumbent managers"-a task for which judges are poorly positioned in light of the fact that "every successful takeover defense has an entrenchment effect." Thompson & Smith, supra note 81, at 262; see also id. at
280-98.
157.
See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350, 1354 (Del. 1985).
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While Delaware does require that the board maximize the price paid to
shareholders in transactions in which the corporation will essentially be
sold, the cases have established that the circumstances under which such a
duty applies are exceedingly narrow. Where the corporation faces an "inevitable" sale, break-up, or change of control, the Delaware Supreme
Court has reasoned (since its 1986 Revlon opinion) that the board "no
longer face[s] threats to corporate policy and effectiveness," 15 8 because
there is no longer a long-term future for the corporation in which incumbent management's conception of appropriate policy could play out. In
such a last-period scenario, then, the issue of defensive measures becomes
"moot," and the "directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company."' 59 It is only in this narrow set of
circumstances where Delaware courts speak of maximizing return to
shareholders and will not permit boards to impede it out of regard for the
interests of other constituencies."
Indeed, Delaware courts have strictly limited the application of such
Revlon duties to board-initiated transactions, reinforcing the de facto
power of boards to deviate from shareholder wealth maximization, even in
the context of hostile bids raising the prospect of enormous cash premia
for shareholders.161 In Paramount v. Time'62 the court held that-even in
the face of an all-cash, all-shares bid at a 59% premium, where the
board's alternative plan would leave the company laboring under up to $10
billion in new debt-the deferential Unocal standard remained applicable
so long as the board's defensive measures did not represent "an abandon63
ment of the corporation's continued existence."
This holding starkly illustrates the extraordinary reach of the business
judgment rule, even where the board's alternative plan appears downright
ugly relative to the premium offer on the table. The court phrased the issue as being whether "Time's board, having developed a strategic plan of
global expansion to be launched through a business combination with
158.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
159.
Id.; see also Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43-44 (Del.
1994) (stating that the Revlon test applies to "a sale of control").
160.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 429-30; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciaryand the
Meaning of CorporateLife and CorporateLaw, 68 TEx. L. REV. 865, 913-15 (1990); see also Revlon,
506 A.2d at 182 (finding a breach of fiduciary duty in prioritizing the interests of creditors in connection with the "sale" of a corporation).
161.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the court intends to permit wholesale abandonment of
shareholders' interests in the Unocal context. Indeed, Revlon makes clear that the board's "regard for
various constituencies" under Unocal must be accompanied by "rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders." Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. The contention, rather, is that the focus on long-term
performance, coupled with extraordinary deference to the board's judgment, renders deviations from
shareholder wealth maximization effectively unpoliceable.
162.
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
163.
Id. at 1149-53.
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Warner, [came] under a fiduciary duty to jettison its plan and put the corporation's future in the hands of its shareholders. " " In answering in the
negative, the court advanced rationales tending to reinforce the board's
ability to deviate from shareholder wealth maximization. First, the court
cited the Unocal language explicitly stating that boards can consider the
effects on non-shareholder constituencies when evaluating takeover bids.65
Second, it cited both the business judgment rule and the board's authority
under § 141 as placing "the selection of a time frame for achievement of
corporate goals" within the board's discretion, permitting the board to
focus on "long-term" shareholder wealth maximization where it deems
appropriate.166 This move functioned to permit Time's board unilaterally
to refuse to negotiate with Paramount (the hostile bidder) and to conclude
for itself that its own plan offered long-term benefits to shareholders exceeding the benefits of the all-cash premium bid on the table-regardless
of what shareholders themselves might conclude. 167
As many have noted, the court's extension of business judgment deference to decisions regarding the time frame for the pursuit of corporate
goals gives boards substantial latitude to deviate from shareholder wealth
maximization in all but the narrowest circumstances.' 68 As Blair and Stout
have observed, the outcome in Paramount v. Time is tantamount to a conclusion that "a decision reducing the immediate market value of the Time
shareholders' interests by thirty-five percent did not violate the directors'
duties of loyalty or care. ,169 To make explicit what has been implicit in
my argument to this point: an adequate descriptive theory of corporate law
cannot rest at citing the court's nominal commitment to long-term shareholder wealth maximization in such cases. It must also account for what
this verbal formula translates into in concrete cases, and Paramount v.
Time presents a supreme challenge for those who accept the "long-term"
device as a means of squaring the cases with shareholder wealth maximization. As Lyman Johnson aptly put it, "the chief attraction of the longrun phantom is its marvelous ability to apparently harmonize management
discretion with shareholder primacy while, in fact, sweeping the whole
thing under the rug."' 7 The emphasis on "long-term" shareholder interests, in practice, implicitly endorses board decision-making aimed at en-

164.
Id. at 1149-50.
165.
Id. at 1153.
166.
Id. at 1153-54.
167.
Id.; see also Gordon, supra note 81, at 523-25.
168.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 428-29; Elhauge, supra note 18, at 819-20; Johnson, supra note 160, at 900-02; Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1079.
169.
Blair & Stout, supranote 87, at 429.
170.
Johnson, supra note 160, at 902.
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suring the stability and sustainability of the corporation, redounding to the
benefit of all stakeholders, even when the shareholders take a hit for it.' 7

This conception of the scope of business judgment deference brings us
to the middle of the spectrum depicted in Figure 1, representing the vast

majority of business decisions in which neither of the extremes of clear

"selfishness" or "altruism" are implicated. As many have argued, the
business judgment rule functions every day to insulate countless decisions

from second-guessing of any sort, permitting corporate decision-makers to
deviate from the path of shareholder wealth maximization without fear of

judicial intervention or negative consequences-so long as they can come
up with some form of rationalization phrased in terms of "long-term"
shareholder interests.' 72
Even the famous Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.' 73 case-often cited as the
quintessential statement of a duty to maximize shareholder wealth' 7 4- is
comprehensible in these terms. The litigation arose out of Henry Ford's

refusal to pay dividends, notwithstanding available cash and cash equivalents exceeding $50 million, in favor of a business expansion plan and
price reductions. 7 5 The Michigan Supreme Court's opinion did include a
171.
On this point, it is interesting to observe that immediately following the quotation from Unocal endorsing consideration of other constituencies, the court rejects outright the notion of focusing on
the type of mental exercise a shareholder, concerned solely with her own interests, might engage in-a
comparison of the present discounted value of stock of the combined Time-Warner with the premium
bid on the table. See Paramount Commc'ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990). Implicit,
then, in the court's analysis is a rejection of the idea that the market itself can efficiently bring to bear
anticipated future value on present stock price. As Blair and Stout put it, "[tihe only way such a decision could be consistent with shareholder primacy and market efficiency is if the court believed that
Time's directors had access to private information indicating that the Warner merger would soon
produce tremendous benefits that eventually would be incorporated into the market price and raise it
above the Paramount offer." Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 429 n.73. Again, the claim is not that the
court has formally divorced the doctrine from nominal focus on shareholders' interests, but that by
placing this entirely within the board's discretion, it permits de facto (and in this case, apparently quite
substantial) deviations from shareholder interests that cannot be effectively policed.
172.
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 272-73; Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 428-29; Blair &
Stout, supra note 46, at 299-305; Elhauge, supra note 18, at 770-71; Johnson, supra note 160, at 90002; Lee, supra note 94, at 35; Orts, supra note 13, at 1599; cf JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN
FINANCE 185, 189-94 (1999) (arguing that the inadequacy of shareholder wealth maximization as
guidance for corporate decision-makers is in practice resolved by reference to the interests of nonshareholder constituencies); Robert N. Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maxinization, HARv. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1960, at 126-28 (arguing that business leaders in fact pursue a "satisfactory" return
for shareholders due to practical and moral difficulties raised by attempting to "maximize" profits);
Orts, supra note 13, at 1590-91 (observing that "everyday complexities of business management"
render the concrete meaning of shareholder wealth maximization ambiguous); Douglas G. Baird & M.
Todd Henderson, Other People's Money 15-19 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 359, 2d series, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstractid= 1017615 (observing that the business judgment rule effectively permits deviations from shareholder wealth maximization, but in so doing "invites circumlocution" in that "discussion becomes couched in terms that are
somewhat tortured, but less likely to make waves" than would frank admission of the advancement of
other stakeholders' interests).
173.
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
174.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 777-78; Bainbridge, supranote 116, at 1616.
175.
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
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strongly worded warning that corporations are not to be run "for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of
benefiting others.", 17 It should, however, be observed that (1) the issue
arose only because Henry Ford actually said that dividends were being

withheld in order to advance the interests of non-shareholders (through
expanded employment and reduced prices); 177 (2) the court explicitly did
not question cases endorsing "incidental humanitarian expenditure" where
the board was "acting for the best interests of the corporation"; 178 and (3)
even though the court ultimately ordered Ford to pay a dividend, it did so
only after permitting the company's substantial business expansion plan to
go ahead.179 Notably, the court cited the lack of any indication that the
expansion plan would "menace the interests of shareholders"-under the
circumstances, presumably their long-term interests. 180 Put differently, the
shareholders got their dividend, but only after enough cash had been set
aside to fund the board's long-term plan. Like in the takeover context, the
emphasis on the long-term implicitly endorses board decision-making
aimed at ensuring firm stability and sustainability, even where that comes
at the expense of shareholders."18
Later cases have emphasized such points in side-stepping the Dodge
opinion's strong language regarding shareholder interests.182 In the Wrigley
case, for example, an Illinois court rejected a minority shareholder's challenge of Philip Wrigley's decision that the Chicago Cubs-unlike every

other team in the majors-would eschew night baseball, a decision explicitly aimed not at the maximization of return to shareholders, but rather
based on his conviction that baseball was and should remain a "daytime
sport," and that "installation of lights and night baseball games [would]

have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood."' 83 The
176.
Id. at 684.
177.
Id. at 683-84.
178.
Id. at 684.
179.
Id. at 684-85.
180.
Id. at 684.
181.
Cf. ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 295 ("A board's decision today
to use retained earnings to fund investments, price reductions, or even increased employee wages
would easily be justified as a device to increase long-term corporate earnings and, as such, would be
immune from shareholder attack."); Baird & Henderson, supra note 172, at 10, 32, 43-44 (arguing
that current corporate law doctrine cannot be reconciled with the claim that the board owes a fiduciary
duty to shareholders, advocating the elimination of fiduciary duties in favor of facilitation of more
complete contracting, and suggesting that boards "should take from court decisions the simple maxim
that they should do what is in the best interest of the firm, measured from the perspective of the ex
ante bargain among investors"). Lynn Stout has in fact argued that "Dodge v. Fordis indeed bad law,
at least when cited for the proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth," and that consequently "instructors and scholars should stop teaching and citing" the
case. Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE
LAW 1, 2-3 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008).
182.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01, reporter's note para. 2 (2005) (identifying this development in subsequent case law).
183.
ShIensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 777-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (internal quotation marks
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plaintiff pointed to Dodge, but the Wrigley court, seizing on the Dodge
court's acceptance of Ford's expansion plan for its arguable consistency
with long-term shareholder interests, decided that Wrigley's own decision
to reject night baseball could be squared with the "long run interest of the
corporation" in maintaining the health of the neighborhood surrounding
the ball park."8 Similarly, in A.P. Smith the New Jersey Supreme Court
bent over backward to find a donation to Princeton University acceptably
connected with the shareholders' long-term interests, looking not only to
the cultivation of an employee pool and good will in the community, but
even to the maintenance of capitalism and the "free enterprise" system
itself. 85
The doctrinal approach established by case law on the business judgment rule and this emphasis on the long-run-which, again, applies to the
vast majority of corporate decisions-has been reinforced in states with socalled "other constituency" statutes. By 2005 thirty states had adopted
statutes explicitly permitting corporate managers to consider the interests
of non-shareholder constituencies, and most of these statutes applied not
only in the takeover context, but to all corporate decision-making.186 Indiana's statutory fiduciary duty standard, for example, adds that a "director
may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider the effects
of any action on shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers of the
corporation, and communities in which offices or other facilities of the
corporation are located, and any other factors the director considers pertinent."187 Similarly, though considerably more broadly, the American Law
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance provide that "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business. "188 Such statutes obviously eliminate any doubt as
to the permissibility of bringing the interests of non-shareholders to bear
omitted).
184.
Id. at 779-81.
185.
See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583-86 (N.J. 1953). The court obliquely
reveals Cold War-related concerns in applauding such corporations for "recogniz[ing] that we are
faced with other, though nonetheless vicious, threats from abroad which must be withstood without
impairing the vigor of our democratic institutions at home and that otherwise victory will be pyrrhic
indeed." Id. at 586.
186.
See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 763. Connecticut in fact goes further, stating that directors of
public corporations considering fundamental transactions "shall consider" the "long-term" interests of
the corporation and shareholders, "the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors
and suppliers," and "community and societal considerations." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2005).
187.
IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2005). Indiana's statute also explicitly-and pointedly-rejects
Delaware's heightening of directors' duties in the sale-of-control context. See id. § 23-1-35-1(0.
188.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(2)
(2005); see also id. § 4.01 (including a strong version of the business judgment rule); Orts, supra note
13, at 1604-05.
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on corporate decisions, and may even preclude corporations from creating
an explicit duty to maximize shareholder wealth through their charters.189
B. The Ambivalence of CorporateLaw
So to return to the questions posed at the outset, who possesses ultimate corporate governance authority? For whose benefit are public corporations run? And what is corporate law's relationship to the achievement
of the social good? It would appear that corporate law remains deeply ambivalent on each score.
Again, for clarity and ease of reference, I set out in Figure 2 each of
the fundamental issues to be addressed and the principal manifestations of
corporate law's ambivalence with respect to each issue, and then proceed
to describe them below.

Manifestations:

Regarding:

power con-

.

§ 141 (board authority) v.

stituencies

o

§ 211 (shareholder franchise)

o

transferability of shares (takeover jurisprudence)

o

§ 109 (shareholder bylaws)

* co-approval of fundamental transactions
beneficiaries

e shareholder wealth maximization v.
o

§ 122(9) (donations)

o

takeover jurisprudence

o

business judgment rule

e fiduciary duties owed to corporation and shareholders
social good

* weak utilitarian commitment to shareholder wealth maximi-

zation

Figure 2. Corporate Law's Ambivalence
189.

See Elhauge, supra note 18, at 863-64; Johnson, supra note 160, at 870-71, 909-10.
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Power Constituencies

Corporate law remains fundamentally ambivalent regarding the relative authority of what I have termed the corporation's power constituen-

cies-the board and the shareholders. As discussed above, the board's
claim to authority is rooted in DGCL § 141(a), which says that the "business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors"-a sweeping grant of power by any
estimation." However, the statute and case law also grant substantial

power to shareholders, and in some instances employ language that is arguably just as broad as that in § 141(a). As we have seen, one clear counterbalance to board power under § 141(a) is the shareholders' right to elect
the board under § 211(b)191-a right arguably suggesting that the board's
power is simply derivative of, and therefore legitimated by, shareholder

endorsement. This balance is arguably reinforced by the division of power
between the board and shareholders over fundamental transactions. Although the fact that shareholders cannot initiate fundamental transactions
has been cited as evidence of board supremacy, we might observe by the
same token that the board cannot approve such transactions on its own.

The statute in fact envisions co-approval, favoring neither power constituency in the critical context of fundamental transactions. 192 As the Delaware
Supreme Court has put it, the DGCL "expressly provides for a balance of
power between boards and stockholders which makes merger transactions
a shared enterprise. " "'
Indeed, this form of power-sharing additionally renders more comprehensible the limits that Delaware courts have placed on the free transfer190.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
191.
Id. § 211(b).
192.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(b), 251(b)-(c), 271(a) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (giving the
board the power to initiate, and the shareholders the power to approve, charter amendments, mergers,
and sales of substantially all assets, respectively); UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005
Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *25 n.48 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (observing that board power is "constrained by . . .shareholders' right to vote" under these statutory provisions); see also Thompson &
Smith, supra note 81, at,306 (identifying co-approval of fundamental transactions as recognizing "the
space within which a well-functioning corporate-governance system requires shareholder action, the
space where directors cannot have absolute authority"). It should be borne in mind that for those
Delaware corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange, shareholders have the right to approve
an expanded list of transactions, notably including certain transactions involving the issuance of common stock equaling 20% of pre-transaction outstanding shares or voting power, and transactions involving a "change of control." See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c)-(d) (2007),
at
available
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.google.com/search%3Fhl%3Den%26q
Other
%3DListed +Company +Manual %26btnG%3DSearch&displayPage =/lcm/lcmsection.htnl.
exchanges have similar rules. See OESTERLE, supra note 42, at 134-38.
193.
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003). Although this
Article focuses on corporate law, it should be observed that similar expressions of ambivalence regarding the balance of power between boards and shareholders have been identified in the evolution of
U.S. securities laws. See generally Mitchell, supra note 25.

2008]

The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law

1423

ability of shares in the hostile tender offer context. While the omission
from the statute of board authority to respond to tender offers is perhaps
puzzling,"9 courts in any event have essentially analogized hostile tender
offers to fundamental transactions like mergers (as opposed to, say, a series of one-off stock purchases from individual shareholders)195 through
the construction of a takeover jurisprudence achieving a similar balance
between board and shareholder power. 196 As discussed above, Delaware's
approach to defensive tactics walks a fine line between deference to board
authority under § 141 and the business judgment rule, on the one hand,
and limiting defensive measures to those that can be overcome indirectly
through a proxy contest (and thus by vote-wielding shareholders) on the
other. "
Another important reflection of this fundamental ambivalence regarding power constituencies is the statutory counter-balance between the
board's authority under § 141 and the shareholders' authority to enact bylaws under § 109-a grant of power similarly sweeping in its terms. Under
§ 109, shareholders have the unilateral power to "adopt, amend or repeal
bylaws," which "may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or
with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees. " 98 Like §
141(a), this grant of power to shareholders explicitly refers to the "business" and "affairs" of the corporation, and the only explicit limits regard194.
See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1086 (declining to take a position regarding
whether omission of tender offers from the statute was deliberate, but "recogniz[ing] the cogency of
the argument that if the statutory drafters had foreseen the impact of hostile tenders [sic] offers upon
corporate governance, the board's role in approving such offers might have found its way explicitly
into the statute").
195.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 68, at 811 ("The question has become whether unsolicited
tender offers are more like secondary market trading or like mergers."); TW Services, Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, *33-*34 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Allen, C.) (observing that
tender offers can resemble "change in control transactions that are functionally similar to merger
transactions," yet at the same time "essentially represent the sale of shareholders' separate property").
196.
See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-50, 1154 (Del.
1990) (declining to "put the corporation's future in the hands of its shareholders," in part by interpreting the board's authority under § 141(a) to include the selection of a time-frame for the achievement of
corporate strategy).
197.
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995) (stating that
where a hostile takeover attempt couples a proxy contest with a tender offer, courts "must recognize
the special import of protecting the shareholders' franchise within Unocal's requirement that any
defensive measure be proportionate" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353-54 (Del. 1985) (finding that a preemptive poison pill did
not preclude tender offers in part because shareholders could remove the board through a proxy contest); cf. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1094-95 (observing that while "the realities of the
corporate election process" generally limit its efficacy, the process yet "functions vigorously" when it
"amounts to a referendum about a pending tender offer bid"). For conflicting views on the viability of
the market for corporate control envisioned by such cases, see supra notes 103-105 and accompanying
text.
198.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a)-(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
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ing the substance of such bylaws are that they must be consistent with
"law" and the certificate of incorporation. 199
As a practical matter, the crucial question is obviously whether shareholders can unilaterally adopt bylaws substantially limiting the board's
governance authority under § 141(a)-in particular, through a bylaw forcing the board to redeem or modify the corporation's poison pill. To the
surprise of many students new to corporate law, this fundamental question
remains open in Delaware. 2" Delaware corporate law firms "have opined
that a mandatory bylaw would constitute an invalid intrusion by the shareholders into the realm protected by § 141(a)," but the matter remains unresolved.2 1 This is an issue to which I will return below,2 2 but for present
purposes the critical point is simply the fact that the relationship between
these two similarly worded grants of power has remained unclear for so
long. Put differently, if any one of the prevailing theories of corporate law
canvassed above were so clearly correct as their authors suggest, this
would not present nearly so difficult a question.
2. Beneficiaries
Corporate law likewise remains deeply ambivalent regarding the intended beneficiaries of corporate production, and their relative priority
under varying circumstances. Strong pressures to maximize stock price
spring from the very capital market realities that have given rise to the
widely held "public" corporation. As discussed above, in the modern public corporation we have a structure in which, regardless of their formal
powers, retail shareholders generally remain rationally apathetic through
much of the ordinary life of the corporation-a tendency reinforced by
modern portfolio theory's emphasis on diversification, as discussed below.20 3 In general, retail shareholders are both unaware of and unaffected
by the realities of corporate production, and are thus freed from whatever
constraints of conscience might have impacted their decisions, had they
been directly involved (say, directly undertaking such business themselves). Boards, meanwhile, occupy a more complex position, both doctrinally and due to their direct and on-going involvement in the corporation's
affairs. Boards face substantial equity market pressure to maximize current
stock price by virtue of the fact that morally and socially insulated shareholders can single-mindedly focus on stock price and sell out of the in199.
See id.
200.
See Smith, supra note 94, at 6 n.28; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REv. 409, 413-17 (1998) (observing the "critical dearth of precedent" in this area).
201.
ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 623-24.
202.
See infra Part V.
203.
See infra Subpart IV.A.
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vestment if they perceive it to be under-performing (the "Wall Street
Rule") .2' This equity market pressure, then, is reinforced by the shareholders' privileged legal position within the corporate structure vis-A-vis
other constituencies, reflected in their authority to elect the board, as well
as the fact that fiduciary duties are owed to them directly, permitting
shareholders to sue both directly and derivatively for breaches of fiduciary
duty.
As we have seen, however, corporate law's commitment to shareholder wealth maximization remains far from clear and comprehensive.
Recall that no state has imposed a clear duty to maximize shareholder
wealth, and indeed that states have been all too ready to explicitly permit
corporations to give away shareholder wealth through charitable donations. Likewise recall that statutes and case law permit boards to consider
non-shareholder interests in discharging their fiduciary duties in various
circumstances-notably the hostile takeover context. Even Delaware has
made clear that "absent a limited set of circumstances" in which the corporation literally has no long-term future because its demise has become
inevitable, "a board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to
maximize shareholder value in the short term. 20 5 And that this is equally
true both within and without the takeover context only reinforces the
board's substantial de facto discretion to deviate from shareholder wealth
maximization in the day-to-day business of the corporation under the business judgment rule, so long as some plausible long-term benefit to the
shareholders can be articulated.
Perhaps the clearest expression of corporate law's ambivalence regarding intended beneficiaries of corporate production, however, is the fact
that corporate boards are deemed to owe fiduciary duties to shareholders
and the corporation simultaneously. Recall that the Delaware Supreme
Court, in its 1939 Guth v. Loft opinion, told us that corporate officers and
directors "stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders" 2 6-a formulation to which the court remains committed. 0 7
Armed with this formulation of the relevant fiduciary relations, who would
a newly minted director conclude the principal beneficiaries of her efforts
were supposed to be? Lyman Johnson has suggested that this formulation
may represent "a pragmatic doctrinal accommodation" of differing views
of "corporate purpose"; rather than addressing the theoretical tension
See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 680 (1986) (conceding that corporate
204.
managers possess discretion to deviate from "strict profit maximization," but arguing that "the evidence for the power of capital market controls on managerial behavior is very strong").
205.
Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
206.
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added).
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del.
207.
is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obliga2007) (citing Guth and noting that "[i]t
tions to the corporation and its shareholders").
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forthrightly, corporate law "simply equivocated" and "bracketed" the
problem (an approach that worked reasonably well until the hostile take-

over wave hit). 208 Favored though the stockholders may be, relative to
other constituencies, in the respects noted above, the very fact that corporate law has not seen fit to elevate either the "stockholders" or the "corporation" over the other suggests a deep ambivalence about the ultimate ends

of corporate production (and an implicit rejection of both strict boardcentric and strict shareholder-centric governance theories).
Indeed, in an article published by the University of Chicago Law Re-

view in 2002, three highly respected Delaware jurists (one turned academic) argued that Delaware corporate law "remains ambivalent" as between shareholder wealth maximization, on the one hand, and what they
described as "a partial commitment by the law to values in addition to

implementing shareholder will," on the other.20 9 Because the Delaware

legislature itself has never clarified whether the corporation's primary
purpose is to maximize the wealth of shareholders or the aggregate well-

being of all its stakeholders, judges have inevitably been thrust into the
middle of patently political questions. 21 "Most judges," they observe, do
"worry about the legitimacy of their policymaking authority," and consequently engage in the practice only tentatively. 21' Lacking any "popular
mandate," they find it "institutionally safer and more conforming with

tradition to write judicial opinions in a way that obscures policy
choices." 212 There being no greater policy issue in corporate law than to

whose benefit corporate production is intended to redound, we ought not
be surprised that this fundamental ambivalence regarding the primary
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties has so endured. 213 The consequence is
208.
Johnson, supra note 160, at 900 n. 133. See also id. at 923-24; TW Services, Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, *19 n.5, * 28 n.14 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Allen, C.) (observing that "this particular phrase masks the most fundamental issue" regarding the priority of short-term
shareholder interests versus those of others, and that the issue "seems inescapably to involve normative questions").
209.
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1067; see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the
Dynamics of Corporate Governance Issues, DirectorLiability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1015-16 (2003).
210.
See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1068-69; Johnson, supra note 160, at 887.
211.
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1070.
212.
Id. at 1070-71; see also id. at 1078 (observing that the DGCL remains silent regarding when
and how boards may impede a tender offer); Johnson, supra note 160, at 873-76, 887-90, 897.
213.
Perhaps we ought not be any more surprised that Delaware jurists have chastised academics
for "talking past each other," advancing extreme theoretical claims and proposed reforms so "otherworldly" as to "have no realistic chance for implementation." Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at
1072; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J.
CoRp. L. 1, 3, 5 (2007) (criticizing the "so-called corporate governance debate" in which
"[e]xaggeration is the norm; conversation the exception," and criticizing "corporate law scholars" and
others "who profit in monetary and psychic ways from corporate governance tumult"); Veasey, supra
note 209, at 1011 (describing the takeover debate as "an extraordinary symphony with half the orchestra playing in A major and the other half playing simultaneously in B-flat minor").
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nominal commitment to shareholder wealth maximization while leaving
boards ample room to bring the interests of other constituencies to bear
upon their decisions.
3. The Social Good
Corporate law's ambivalence regarding power constituencies and
beneficiaries together point toward a third form of fundamental ambivalence regarding corporate law's role in advancing the greater social good,
to which corporate production is generally assumed to contribute. 2 4 To
state the matter most simply, the degree to which corporate law itself may
directly aim for the advancement of the social good depends on the consistency of the interests of the principal beneficiaries of corporate conduct
with whatever the social good is thought to be-a calculus requiring not
only some conception of the social good, but also a clear determination of
which constituencies' claims upon the corporation take priority. In order,
then, to illuminate further corporate law's conception of its role in the
achievement of the social good, I turn briefly to the implicit moral theory
of corporate law-utilitarianism-and examine the degree and nature of its
commitment to shareholder wealth maximization through that lens.215
Given the degree of industrialization and specialization that typifies
modern developed societies like ours, it is unsurprising that corporate law
and capital markets-indeed, modern economics-would implicitly advance a relatively abstract, distant, and productivity-oriented moral theory. 2 6 As Mark Roe has observed, the "prevailing academic and business
view in the United States is that shareholder wealth maximization fits with
a utilitarian, greatest-good-for-the-greatest-number philosophy." 217 Roe
summarizes the standard position as follows:
The utilitarian justification is that this preference is the price paid
for strong capital markets, and allocative efficiency and that these
benefits are so powerful that they overwhelm the normative benefit
of any distributional favoring of current employees over current
shareholders. In the long run, the argument goes, employees and
other stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient
capital markets, managers need a simple metric to follow, and both
214.
See, e.g., ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 2 ("In all events, the
modem law of organizational forms-most notably corporation law-is premised on the idea that
facilitating individuals' efforts to create wealth is wise public policy."); Mitchell, supra note 25, at
1560-63.
215.
See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2063, 2065 (2001).
216.
The rise of utilitarianism has generally been associated with the advent of industrialism. See,
e.g., RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 55-56 (1958); WALTER E. HOUGHTON, THE
VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND, 1830-1870, at 110-12, 268-69 (1957).
217.
See Roe, supra note 215, at 2065.
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wealth and, in the end, fairness are maximized by shareholders being the corporation's residual beneficiary, with the other claimants
getting what they want via contract with the corporation. Current
employees might be made worse off in some industries, but employees overall will have more opportunities, higher salaries, and
better working conditions.2 18
Before we can say anything concrete about this, we must first clarify
what type of "utilitarianism" this reflects. John Stuart Mill, one of the best
known proponents of utilitarianism, explained that the "creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."219
Over time such vocabulary has given way to "human welfare," "satisfaction of desires and preferences," and so on-through which formulations
utilitarianism animates modern economic theory.22 ° But in any event, operationalizing utilitarianism depends critically on how one actually calculates aggregate utility. Two distinct approaches have emerged. According
to "act" utilitarians, the rightness of an action depends upon whether that
action in itself would maximize utility.22 1 According to "rule" utilitarians,
on the other hand, the rightness of an action depends upon whether it is in
accord with a rule that, ifgenerally accepted, would maximize utility.222
Thus an act utilitarian might excuse a lie told under specific circumstances
where the truth would appear to do more harm than good, whereas a rule
utilitarian might reject this conclusion, arguing that any lie is wrong because conformity with a rule of truth-telling maximizes utility over time.223
Armed solely with these concepts, we might be tempted to categorize
the argument for shareholder wealth maximization, summarized by Roe,
as "rule utilitarian" in that it focuses on the "long run" maximization of
the welfare of all stakeholders through adherence to a practice. It is explicitly acknowledged that things might not pan out in specific instances for
specific stakeholders-say, employees in a given company or industrybut nevertheless it is maintained that over time employees as a class across
society "will have more opportunities, higher salaries, and better working
conditions" if shareholder wealth maximization is uniformly pursued.2 24
218.
Id. Roe argues, however, that this does not hold true in other countries "with mostly concentrated industry and weak product market competition." Id.; cf. Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain
the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CmI. L. REV. 1251 (2002).
219.
JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 144 (Bantam Books
1993) (1871).
220.
See BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 55.
221.
See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 119-21 (1965); BOATRIGHT,
supra note 172, at 54.
222.
See LYONS, supra note 221, at 119-21; BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 54.
223.
LYONS, supra note 221, at 121-25; BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 54.
224.
See Roe, supra note 215, at 2065.
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Viewed in this light, however, we immediately encounter some significant
problems with this account. As we have seen, (1) shareholder wealth
maximization is not, in fact, a mandatory general rule; (2) even if it were,
it would remain unenforceable in most day-to-day circumstances due to the
business judgment rule; and (3) deviations are explicitly endorsed in certain circumstances in jurisdictions like Delaware, and across the board in
many other jurisdictions. Thus it appears that this account of corporate
law's "utilitarian" commitment to shareholder wealth maximization is-as
a descriptive matter-oversimplified.2 25
An additional refinement of the nature and degree of corporate law's
utilitarian commitment to shareholder wealth maximization may help to
clarify the matter. Philosopher David Lyons has argued that act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, upon close inspection, are "extensionally
equivalent" in that a rule justified by reference to a utilitarian principle can
be rendered complete only through multiplication of exceptions and qualifications, presumably proportionate to the complexity of the decisionmaking context. 226 The purported "rule" in essence morphs into a presumption, and the inquiry simply becomes when one is justified in acting
contrary to that presumption-an operation not materially different from
application of the utilitarian principle directly to the acts in question.227
Indeed, act utilitarians themselves, Lyons argues, are apt to accept such
"rules," so construed, as "reliable guides to right action: they presumably
represent and summarize or generalize upon centuries of mankind's experience regarding the usual utility of socially important types of acts."228
This is in fact the best that could be said of corporate law's utilitarian
commitment to shareholder wealth maximization-a "guide[] to right action" that, due to the technical, social and moral complexity of the decision-making context, is riddled with exceptions and qualifications.229
Shareholder wealth maximization is, at best, what Lyons would call a "de
facto moral rule[]," a presumption easing the rigors of act-utilitarian application of a general utilitarian principle, not a true "rule" in the ruleutilitarian sense.230 And as a consequence of its status as a de facto moral
225.
Note that I speak here of corporate law's implicit moral theory, rather than applying an external moral theory-the point being that these legal realities tend to contradict the claim that corporate
law itself in fact treats shareholder wealth maximization as a utility maximizing rule. On the distinction between applying rules that contain a utilitarian principle, on the one hand, and judging the utility
of rules by reference to a utilitarian principle external to those rules, on the other, see LYONS, supra
note 221, at 180-84.

226.
See id. at 62-197.
227.
Id. at 121-33.
228.
Id. at 148.
229.
Id.
230.
Id. Regardless of whether one accepts Lyons' categorical claim regarding the extensional
equivalence of rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism, the complexity of the decision-making context
faced by corporate directors renders the status of shareholder wealth maximization in corporate law
particularly amenable to description by the terms he employs.
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rule, "we must also adopt this escape clause: follow the rule[], indeed, but
not when you know or are quite certain that breaking [it] will have better
effects on the whole than keeping to it." 131 As a mere "practical approach
towards maximizing utility"-a "way of deliberating and of effectively
solving problems of conduct to best ensure conformity" to some underlying utilitarian principle 23 2-corporate law expresses real confidence in the
social utility of shareholder wealth maximization. But likewise corporate
law remains highly skeptical of its strict application in numerous circumstances, and consequently remains unwilling to place all of our eggs in that
basket.
Now, thinking back to the forms of ambivalence described aboveambivalence regarding power constituencies, regarding beneficiaries, and
regarding the role of corporate law in ensuring consistency with the social
good-the three are revealed to be distinct though related facets of an underlying problem in corporate law and theory. As Lyons ultimately observes in his book Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, we often "seek to
'justify' or 'account for"' such de facto moral rules-in this case, shareholder wealth maximization-by simply "not[ing] that the rules are useful," without more.233 The problem is that "this involves applying an unspecified 'principle of utility,"' evading the truly critical issues: "how
useful a rule (or practice) must be if it is to be 'justified,"' and related to
that, how we can know when the presumption may be overcome by reference to that underlying principle of utility itself-whatever it may be.234
At this point, we arrive at what is perhaps the defining paradox of the
public corporation-as of industrial capitalism, of which it is a quintessential expression. Through corporate law, we effectively outsource the pursuit of the social good to an entity lacking the legitimacy or the practical
ability to articulate what the "social good" actually is. In essence, this
reality differs in no material respect from what Adam Smith perceived to
be the essence of any market-based economy: the pursuit of self-interest,
by which the market actor is thought to be "led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention. "235 As with industrial
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 194.
Id.
The passage reads:
By preferring the support of domestick [sic] to that of foreign industry, [the individual] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 351-52

(J.C. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776).
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capitalism generally, this paradox of the public corporation's social utility
is irresolvable, and consequently the fundamental ambivalence of corporate law can be expected to endure. As then-Chancellor Allen has observed, within the public corporation "exists the tension that a dynamic
market system creates between the desire to achieve increases in total
wealth and the desire to avoid the losses and injuries . . . that a dynamic
system inevitably engenders." 236 It is an "elemental tension" that he rightly
identifies with industrial capitalism, "aris[ing] from the longing for stability and community in the liberal society." As a result, the corporation
becomes "the locus of many conflicting claims," both economic and social, and "defining what we suppose a public corporation to be" becomes
indistinguishable from "express[ing] our view of the nature and purpose of
237
our social life."

Ultimately, it appears that corporate law's ambivalence vis-A-vis
shareholders-as power constituency, as beneficiaries, and as representatives of society's interests-reflects real but incomplete confidence in the
consistency of shareholders' incentives and interests with those of the larger public. The consequence is a system of dual authority in which, ironically, neither power constituency generally possesses the practical ability
to make strong, direct appeals to the social good within the ordinary life of
the corporation. 23 ' To the extent we can identify an underlying "utilitarA few observations regarding the "invisible hand" are warranted here. First, notwithstanding
its current prominence, this is literally the only reference to the concept in The Wealth of Nations.
Second, as used here, the concept is likewise arguably best conceptualized as a defacto moral rule; as
Smith words it, "[bNy pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society"-the implication being that this is not always or inevitably the case (emphasis added). Finally, there is an irony
to the modern reader in that Smith himself employs the concept in arguing that we need not fear international trade because home-country bias-prompted by self-interest--could be expected to curb its
excesses. That is, the "invisible hand" in Smith's example represents not the market liberalizing impulse, but the protectionist one. See id. at 351.
236.
See Allen, supra note 2, at 280.
237.
Id. at 280-81; see also Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1083-85; Orts, supra note 13,
at 1612-23; Johnson, supra note 160, at 934; cf. Anthony, supra note 172, at 126-28 (arguing that
business leaders in fact pursue a "satisfactory" return for shareholders due to practical and moral
difficulties raised by attempting to "maximize" profits).
238.
Corporate law's system of dual authority, among other things, has led some to analogize
corporate governance-and post-Enron reforms, in particular-to the pursuit of "procedural legitimacy" in government. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 159, 161-63; cf. Greenfield, supra note 41, at 5, 9 (drawing an analogy to government in
arguing that "more pluralistic" group decision-making is generally superior). Employing a separation
of powers to ensure legitimacy and to curb abuses is certainly not specific to government. As Federalist No. 51 itself suggests, "[t]his policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public."
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison). While I acknowledge the descriptive force of such
parallels with respect to the imposition of internal procedural checks on power, I nevertheless believe
that such comparisons ought not be pushed too far-principally due to the radically differing postures
and legitimacy of these institutions in articulating the social good and orienting their conduct toward it.
Cf. Coglianese, supra, at 167 (arguing that the degree to which we ought to push for government-like
"procedural legitimacy" in corporations is "the most important policy or normative question that lies
ahead in corporate governance").
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ian" principle guiding corporate governance, it appears to be that long-run
firm sustainability is a good thing, 239 and correlatively, that excessive
board or shareholder power is to be avoided. It should be observed, however, that in substance this is nothing more than a restatement of the assumption that corporate production benefits society, not an articulation of
the precise ends toward which we strive or the acceptable means of getting
there. We accept shareholder wealth maximization as a crude proxy for
the achievement of an undefined "social good"-except when we do not.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. The Rise of InstitutionalShareholders
The picture of the public corporation set out above is stylized in its focus on retail shareholders-again, living, breathing, individual shareholders. Recent decades have, however, seen the emergence of "institutional
shareholders" managing investments on behalf of others. This broad and
diverse category of entities encompasses the likes of mutual funds; public,
private, and union pensions; banks; insurance companies; and hedge
funds. This part of the Article will assess the manner in which such market developments impact the analysis of the public corporation set out
above, and particularly the degree to which they permit shareholders to
assert greater authority in corporate governance-whether motivated by a
conception of the social good or the shareholders' own interests.
The growth of assets under institutional management has been impressive, to say the least. Between 1995 and 2005, total assets under professional management in the United States rose from $7 trillion to $24.4 trillion. 240 According to the Investment Company Institute, as of 2005 U.S.
registered investment companies alone managed $9.5 trillion in assets, of
which 94% ($8.9 trillion) were in mutual funds-a figure representing
about one-half of the world's mutual fund assets. 24' This represents an
increase in U.S. mutual fund assets of over 60% since 1998.242 As of 2005
there were over 15,000 investment companies, and over 500 financial intermediaries from countries around the world providing investment management services in the U.S. market.243 According to the New York Stock
239.
Hence the emphasis on board authority over the time frame for the achievement of corporate
goals, the explicit endorsement of boards favoring long-term value over tender offer premia for shareholders, and so on. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-54
(Del. 1990). As suggested above, I take long-term value maximization to be practically synonymous
with actions aimed at firm "sustainability."
See Soc. INV. FORUM, 2005 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE
240.
UNITED STATES iv (2006).
241.
See INV. CO. INST., 2006 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 6, 12, 114 (46th ed. 2006).
Id.at 114.
242.
243.
Id.at 7, 9.
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Exchange, by 2002 almost 50% of U.S. corporate equity securities were
held by U.S. institutions-up from about 41% in 1990, 28% in 1970, and
just 7% in 1950.2' Almost one-half of U.S. households owned mutual
funds in 2005, up from less than 6% in 1980.245 U.S. retirement funds
under management in 2005 totaled $14.3 trillion, of which mutual funds
accounted for about 24%, with the rest under the management of pension
funds, insurance companies, banks, and brokerage firms. 24 6 It is unsurprising, in light of such data, that indirect stock ownership by individuals has
grown considerably faster than direct stock ownership.2 47
It is often suggested that the emergence of institutional investors has
fundamentally altered the capital market landscape in a way that enables
effective monitoring and thereby favors robust shareholder involvement in
corporate governance. 248 But as a threshold matter, with respect to individual investors, observe that the growth of institutional investment actually amplifies and reinforces the dynamics discussed above. If investors
are insulated from the consequences of corporate production in public corporations in which they own stock directly, then one might reasonably
expect those same individuals to be even more insulated from what is going on in companies the stock of which they own only indirectly through
mutual funds, pension funds, and the like. As Elhauge has observed, "they
are [now] twice removed from knowledge and responsibility." 249 To the
extent that indirect investing eclipses direct investing, the typical retail
investor may not only not be aware of corporate actions and their own
voting rights and responsibilities, but realistically may not know which
companies (or industries) their money is backing-or even, according to
one particularly depressing survey, which specific investment funds or
accounts their money inhabits within a given institution.25 °
244.
See NYSE, Inc., NYSE Fact Book, Holdings of Corporate Equities in the U.S. by Type of
Institution, http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow "Institutional Investors" hyperlink, then follow
"Holdings of corporate equities in the U.S. by type of institution" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 28,
2008); NYSE, Inc., NYSE Fact Book, Holdings of Corporate Equities in the U.S. (end of period, $ in
bils.), http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow "Institutional Investors" hyperlink, then follow
"Holdings of corporate equities in the U.S. (end of period, $ in bils.)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 28,
2008).
245.
See INV. CO. INST., supra note 241, at 46.
246.
Id. at 56.
247.
NYSE, Inc., NYSE Fact Book, Total Number of Sharehowners (mils.) (1989-1998),
http://www.nysedata.com/factbook (follow "The Investing Public" hyperlink, then follow "Total
number of shareholders (mils.) (1989-1998)" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 28, 2008) (reporting that
individuals owning stock directly only grew from 27.0% in 1989 to 33.8% in 1998, whereas individuals owning stock directly, through mutual funds, retirement savings accounts or defined pension plans
grew from 52.3% to 84.0% over the same period).
248.
See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 279-80; see also Anabtawi, supra note 115, at 573-74;
William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in
Delaware Corporate Law 9 (Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper
06/2008, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1105591.
249.
Elhauge, supra note 18, at 817.
250.
See Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research to Interested Parties regarding
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Moreover, the insertion of an additional layer of fiduciaries into the
equation can itself reinforce this distancing of retail investors from corporate realities, particularly in light of diversification goals. Historically,
"institutional investors have focused on major issues in corporate governance and strategic direction and have avoided social issues," a tendency
"dictated both by a fiduciary duty to increase bottom-line value for the
funds' beneficiaries and by the difficulty of articulating a position on social issues" adequately representing the interests of a heterogeneous pool

of beneficiaries.251 These tendencies are greatly enhanced by modem portfolio theory's push to reduce firm-specific risks through diversification.
Indeed the very purpose of mutual funds is to permit small investors to

diversify,252 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
explicitly requires diversification of plan assets as a component of fiduci-

ary duty.253 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that investors ought not even
care about the return from an individual corporation because diversifica-

tion (e.g., through mutual funds) offers the opportunity for a portfolio
representing "an investment in the economy as a whole," which in turn
should lead investors to favor "whatever social or private governance rules

maximize the value of all firms together" 2 -a logic provoking some concem about greater divergence between the interests of equity investors and

other corporate stakeholders, as diversification augments risk tolerance of
the former with respect to any single company."
Thus there are good reasons to doubt that the greater prominence of
institutional investors would, in and of itself, counteract the negative impacts of the corporate structure on investors' moral and social engagement. That said, however, the rise of institutions has been accompanied by

the emergence of two trends perhaps justifying some optimism on the part
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): An Understanding of How SRI is Viewed by TIAA-CREF
at
available
13,
2006),
(July
4
Participants
http:lwww.greenbergresearch.com/articlesl1709/2082_SRI071306m.pdf (reporting survey results
showing that 25% of CREF Social Choice Account participants "either do not know or deny that they
have a CREF SCA account in the first place").
251.
BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 116. Holders of mutual fund shares possess limited voting
rights and are the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. See INv. Co. INST., supra note 241, at 122; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2000) (regarding annual election of directors of registered investment
company by holders of voting securities); id. § 80a-13(a) (requiring vote of securities holders, among
other things, to change subclassification of registered investment company from "diversified" to "nondiversified" or to alter policies enumerated as "fundamental" in the registration statement pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(3)); id. § 80a-35 (regarding civil actions for breach of fiduciary duty by investment advisers); cf. 29 id. § 1104 (establishing fiduciary duty standards in the retirement plan context).
252.
See INv. Co. INsT., supra note 241, at 116, 120, 123; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d); id. §
80a-5(b). Note also that mutual funds can lose favorable "pass-through" tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code if, among other things, they fail to meet "various investment diversification standards." INv. Co. INsT., supra note 241, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
253.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 45, at 29; see also Mitchell, supra note 25, at 1575.
254.
255.
See, e.g., Orts, supra note 13, at 1588-89 (querying "whether this kind of increased risktaking is desirable from a broader social perspective").
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of those troubled by corporate law's fundamental ambivalence: "socially
responsible investing," and "institutional activism," to which I now turn.
B. Socially Responsible Investing
It has been argued-from at least Brandeis' time to our own-that investors in public corporations have a moral obligation to ensure the consistency of corporate production with their values by virtue of the fact that
they voluntarily enter investment relationships and accept benefits flowing
from them.256 "Socially responsible investing" (SRI) is an important reflection of this view.257 Although dating back at least to the nineteenth
century when religious groups "began screening their investments for activities they considered sinful," SRI became more common in the 1960s as
a reflection of "growing opposition to the Vietnam War," and gathered
momentum in the 1980s with the effort to avoid investment in companies
operating in South Africa.258 With the end of South African apartheid in
1993 some thought SRI might decline, but by 1997 SRI assets had reached
$529 billion, and by 1999 had almost tripled to about $1.5 trillion.259 By
2005, according to the Social Investment Forum, total U.S. investment
assets upon which social concerns were brought to bear stood at approximately $2.3 trillion, with $1.685 trillion of that total taking the form of
social screening (as opposed to shareholder advocacy or community investing). Socially screened accounts of institutional clients accounted for
about $1.49 trillion of screened assets, with over 80% of those dollars
representing public pensions.260
The term "SRI" is typically used to describe bringing both financial
and ethical considerations to bear on investment decisions, 261 and as the
data above indicate, works principally through screening out certain companies engaged in specified industries-so-called "sin stocks," such as
tobacco, alcohol, and gambling-or that are deemed to have bad records in
specified issue areas, such as labor relations and the environment.2 62 In so
far as the screens and evaluative principles used can differ substantially,
the definition of SRI can vary quite widely in practice.263

256.
See, e.g., BRANDEIS, supra note 21, at 75; Lee, supra note 94, at 52.
257.
See Knoll, supra note 65, at 682-83.
258.
Id. at 684-85.
259.
Id. at 685-86.
260.
Soc. INv. FORUM, supra note 240, at iv-v, 1, 11-12.
261.
See id. at 2; see also Knoll, supra note 65, at 689. In this Article I treat socially screened
investment and shareholder activism separately to highlight the differing issues involved.
262.

See Soc. INv. FORUM, supra note 240, at 7-8.

263.
See, e.g., BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 108-09; Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef
Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 431, 431-32 (2001); Knoll, supra note 65, at 690.

1436

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 59:5:1385

The CREF "Social Choice Account" provides a useful (and to the
academic reader, particularly relevant) example. As of March 2006, the
account had "grown into the world's largest social screened investment
fund for individual investors," exceeding $8 billion in assets. 2' The account's investment objective is a "favorable long-term rate of return that
reflects the investment performance of the financial markets while giving
special consideration to certain social criteria." 265 More specifically, for
the roughly 60% of the account invested in equities, the "domestic equity
portion attempts to track the return of the U.S. stock market as represented by the Russell 3000® Index," and the "foreign equity portion...
attempts to track the return of developed foreign markets as represented by
the MSCI EAFE® + Canada Index," but generally the account limits its
investments to companies meeting specified social criteria.266 Companies
"currently excluded" include those deriving "any" revenues (or in some
cases, "significant" revenues) from tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms/ammunition, military weaponry, and nuclear power.267 Companies
passing these screens, then, are "evaluated for their records in certain
qualitative areas" including product safety, labor relations, human rights,
corporate citizenship, corporate governance, environmental performance,
and diversity. 268 Those investors who bother to read the prospectus are
warned, however, that the social criteria are "non-fundamental investment
policies," meaning that no vote of account participants would be required
to change them.269 Additionally, due to the exclusions, other holdings have
to be adjusted in order to track the indexes. In light of such restrictions,
one might intuitively predict significant high tech investments, and the
account's top ten holdings as of March 2008 would appear consistent with
that.27°
The principal means by which it is hoped SRI may affect corporate
conduct is downward stock price pressure, 271 and the optimistic detect
264.
Press Release, TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF Forms New Social & Community Investing Deat
http://www.tiaa2006),
available
(May
30,
partment
cref.org/about/press/about_us/releases/pressrelease177.html; see also TIAA-CREF, Retirement Annuity Accounts, CREF Social Choice Account (Mar. 31, 2008) (on file with the Alabama Law Review)
[hereinafter TIAA-CREF, Social Choice Account] (reporting net assets of $8.71 billion as of March
31, 2008).
265.

TIAA-CREF, PROSPECTUS, COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND: INDIVIDUAL, GROUP

AND TAX-DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES 27 (May 1, 2008) (on file with the Alabama Law Review).
266.
Id. at 27-28.
267.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
268.
Id. at 27; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (2000) (requiring vote of securities holders, among
269.
other things, to alter policies enumerated as "findamental" in the registration statement pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(3)).
270.
See TIAA-CREF, Social Choice Account, supra note 264. Note, however, that while the top
ten holdings include Microsoft and AT&T, excluded stocks include Yahoo! Inc. Id.
271.
See, e.g., Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner, supra note 263, at 438; Knoll, supra note 65, at 70204.
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positive signs. Again, U.S. assets upon which social concerns were
brought to bear in 2005 totaled $2.3 trillion, of which $1.685 trillion were
socially screened-a lot of money, to be sure-and these assets have

grown at a rate exceeding that of managed assets overall.272 Moreover,
SRI funds and accounts appear to stack up relatively well in terms of investment return. According to the Social Investment Forum, "when properly managed, risk-adjusted, and controlled for investment style, socially
2 73
screened portfolios perform comparably to their unscreened peers."
Studies suggest that their "performance is, on the whole, no better and no
274

worse than comparable stock portfolios. ,

Notwithstanding such growth, however, SRI assets remain small relative to the enormity of U.S. capital markets. These assets represent about
9% of assets under professional management in the United States, 2 75 and
studies indicate that there is little reason to think that they can affect corporate conduct through stock price pressure. The problem is simply that as
fast as SRI investors can screen out a given stock, which would tend to
push its price downward, non-SRI investors recognize that the stock in
question is underpriced relative solely to expected returns and step in to
buy-keeping the stock price where it was to begin with, thereby insulating boards from any substantial equity market pressure to alter their conduct. 276 This will remain the case "as long as the very large majority of
investors in the market are 'socially indifferent.' ,"277 It is thought that the
number of investors interested in SRI would have to increase dramatically
to affect corporate conduct through stock price pressure.2 78 The growth of
272.
See SOC. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at iv; see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197, 1267-68
(1999) (observing the growth in interest in SRI since the 1970s).
273.
See Soc. INv. FORUM, supra note 240, at 14.
274.
BOATRIGHT, supra note 172, at 110; see also J. David Diltz, The Private Cost of Socially
Responsible Investing, 5 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 69, 69 (1995) (finding that "ethical screening of firms
has little impact on portfolio returns"); Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner, supra note 263, at 446 (citing
studies finding "little difference" in the "stock market performance of green and neutral mutual
funds"); Knoll, supra note 65, at 694-700 (arguing that while SRI does not reduce returns, it does
increase risk by sacrificing diversification, though acknowledging that most of the benefits of diversification can be had with a relatively small number of stocks). But see Jeff Brown, Investing With Your
Conscience Has Its Rewards but May Affect Your Bottom Line, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at FO
(citing data indicating that SRI funds "generally trail traditional competitors," but that the differential
is less for SRI indexes). During the 1990s it appeared that SRI funds might even surpass their peers in
performance, but following the tech boom and bust it became clear that this reflected relative weightings of tech stocks. See Knoll, supra note 65, at 699; Meir Statman, Socially Responsible Indexes, 32
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 100 (2006).
275.
Soc. INv. FORUM, supra note 240, at 1.
276.
See, e.g., Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C. Paul Wazzn, The Effect of Socially Activist
Investment Policies on the FinancialMarkets: Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35
(1999); see also Elhauge, supranote 18, at 817-18; Knoll, supra note 65, at 707-10.
277.
Lee, supranote 94, at 61 n.217.
278.
Heinkel, Kraus & Zechner, supra note 263, at 445-47. Note that although investing in "clean
energy" has picked up and prominent investment banks have issued "fat global-warming reports looking at stocks and industries likely to gain or lose," these and similar developments are generally unre-
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funds like CREF's Social Choice Account may itself inspire optimism,
though a recent survey indicates that even those who already participate
are not terribly well informed; 25% of CREF Social Choice Account participants surveyed, for example, "either do not know or deny that they
have a CREF SCA account in the first place," a finding contributing to the
conclusion that "[e]ducation is the biggest challenge facing efforts to increase the investments in and commitment to socially responsible investing." 279 Meanwhile, the one constant remains that virtually everyone understands and prioritizes financial return.28 °
Such factors may help explain why socially screened assets have actually declined from $2.143 trillion in 2003 to $1.685 trillion in 2005, with
socially screened separate accounts declining from $1.992 trillion to
$1.506 trillion. According to the Social Investment Forum, while screened
mutual fund assets have increased, these are dwarfed by screened separate
account assets-again, mostly institutional-which have decreased "as
single issue screening has waned and shareholder advocacy increased on
the part of institutional investors. "281The Social Investment Forum further
notes that shareholder activism (of which more below), "whether through
the proxy process or in direct dialogue with companies, produced tangible
changes in corporate policies and practices" 282 -something that the studies
above would tend to indicate could not be expected of socially screened
investments (at least in the near term).
These trends do not prove, or even suggest, however, that SRI is entirely ineffective or without consequence. First, the very fact of public
disapproval of certain forms of corporate activity, signaled through social
screening of investments, could have some impact as part of a broader
publicity campaign. 2 " And second, there is clearly nothing wrong withlated to SRI as such. As one observer put it, "[ylou go green by choice, to reflect your values. But
there's nothing optional about global warming and what it might do to the bottom line." Jane Bryant
Quinn, How to Make a Buck Green, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 2007, at 63.
279.
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, supra note 250, at 4, 15.
280.
Id. at 3 (reporting that 92% of Social Choice Account participants and 95% of nonparticipants surveyed agreed with the statement "My first priority in making investments is to have a
secure retirement," and that 85% of participants and 91% of non-participants agreed with the statement "When making investment decisions, financial return is most important to me"); cf. INv. Co.
INST., supra note 241, at 53 (observing that, "[lreflecting the importance of performance in shaping
shareholder opinion, mutual fund favorability rises and falls with stock market performance").
281.
Soc. INv. FORUM, supra note 240, at v, fig.B, n.1.
282.
Id. at v; see also id. at 11-12; cf. U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE & U.N. GLOBAL
COMPACT, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 6 (2006) (initiating a worldwide, voluntary,
principles-based approach "suggest[ing] a policy of engagement with companies rather than screening
or avoiding stocks"-an approach "designed for large investors that are highly diversified and have
large stakes in companies, often making divestment or avoidance impractical"); Press Release, U.N.
Env't Programme Fin. Initiative & U.N. Global Compact, Principles for Responsible Investment Hit
$8 Trillion Mark On First Year Anniversary (Apr. 29, 2007).
283.
See, e.g., SoC. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at 15; see also Ribstein, supra note 103, at
1448-49; Williams, supra note 272, at 1293-96 (arguing that while "it seems unlikely that social investment per se will be able to influence" corporate conduct via stock price pressure, enhanced social
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and per the analysis above, much that is admirable about-investors seeking to bring their investment behavior into focus with their own values.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that this is in fact the principal impetus
behind social screening of investments, 2 4 and this aim remains entirely
legitimate regardless of the near-term prospects for social screening to
impact corporate conduct directly via downward pressure on stock price.
C. InstitutionalActivism
Although institutional investors, with larger holdings and dedicated research staffs, would appear to offer a form of solution to the collective
action problems that plague retail investors, historically institutions have
remained relatively inactive themselves. Indeed, if anything, many institutions have strong incentives to cozy up to corporate management to maintain other lucrative business relationships-be they commercial lending
relationships, insurance relationships, or pension management relationships. Banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and private pension
funds, then, are generally not well positioned to challenge management of
public corporations.285
Consequently, most "activism" as such comes from union pension
funds, public pension funds, and hedge funds-each of which typically has
a distinct agenda, raising concerns about their relative capacities to bring
broadly held shareholder concerns to bear on corporate decision-making.
Union pension fund activism, not surprisingly, has sought to advance labor
interests, and public pension fund activism, again not surprisingly, has
been associated with the political goals of state officials pulling the
strings.286 Giving rise to far greater concerns, however, are hedge funds,
which (like mutual funds) tend to have a distinctly short-term focus on
maximization of current share price. Unlike insurance companies and pendisclosures "could act as an impetus for management to reduce those impacts that shareholders could
interpret as negative").
284.
See, e.g., Soc. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at 15 ("Socially screened mutual funds have
experienced impressive asset growth, driven largely by individual investors who have discovered the
power and relative ease of aligning their investments with their values."); Brown, supra note 274.
285.
See Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 631 n.80; see also Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 706 (observing the "pro-incumbent bias of mutual funds that have a significant interest in obtaining business from
public companies"). But see Kaja Whitehouse, A Changing Story: How Funds Vote, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 2007, at R5 (reporting that mutual funds are devoting greater resources to proxy voting).
286.
See Anabtawi, supra note 115, at 588-90; Bainbridge, supra note 51, at 634 n.88. One recent
study concluded that "when a firm's main unionized employees change affiliation from the AFL-CIO
to a different labor organization, the AFL-CIO funds become significantly more supportive of the
firm's directors in subsequent board elections." Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders:Evidence from Proxy Voting 3 (working paper, Mar. 10, 2008),
available at http://home.uchicago.edu/-aagrawal/AGRAWALjpaper.pdf. "The change in the AFLCIO funds' voting behavior coupled with the lack of a similar response by other institutional investors
suggests that firm-union labor relations have a causal effect on the director votes cast by the AFL-CIO
funds." Id. at 4.
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sion funds, which "are less concerned with quarterly or annual performance" and thus amenable to corporate plans and expenditures bringing
longer-term benefits, hedge funds generally focus narrowly on short-term
287
stock prices and have very high portfolio turnover rates.
This has led many to oppose calls for reforming the shareholder franchise to enhance shareholders' ability to elect and remove directors of
public corporations for fear that hedge funds will run roughshod over the
concerns of non-shareholders and other shareholders alike. The credit rating agency Moody's, for example, has indicated that hedge fund activism
would generally hurt a given corporation's credit rating, an unsurprising
conclusion given the inclination of hedge funds to urge additional debt

upon companies in order to facilitate greater short-term payouts to shareholders, hurting existing creditors by raising debt-to-equity ratios, thereby
increasing the risk of default.288 Some have argued that hedge funds could
bring about beneficial governance changes, 289 but Moody's evidently concluded that for creditors, the negatives of hedge fund activism outweigh
the positives. 290 Others have likewise observed that the short-term focus of
hedge funds conflicts with the longer-term focus and interests of individual
investors (often saving for the education of their children and their own

retirement), managers, and labor alike, and queried whether empowering
this short-term focus is really best for the corporate enterprise as a
whole.2 9'
See Anabtawi, supra note 115, at 579-81. Short-term pressures on mutual funds are attribut287.
able primarily to the liquidity they offer investors coupled with "widespread availability of information
on fund performance," whereas for hedge funds such pressures are attributable primarily to their
generally limited duration and on-going capital needs. See id. at 580.
There is "no precise legal or universally accepted definition" of a hedge fund, but the term
generally refers to investment pools that are limited to a small number of relatively sophisticated
investors, and thus avoid disclosure obligations and SEC examination under federal securities laws.
Consequently, while their advisers remain subject to antifraud provisions of the securities laws, the
SEC possesses relatively little information about them. Their advisers are typically compensated based
on capital gains and appreciation, and generally retain substantial flexibility to alter investment strategies and "broad discretion in valuing the hedge fund's assets"-a source of concern for the SEC, given
that "registered funds that invest their assets in hedge funds may lack access to information that enables them to 'fair value' their interests in hedge funds and therefore accurately calculate their net
asset value." As of September 2003 there were thought to be 6,000-7,000 hedge funds active in the
United States, managing assets of $600-$650 billion, though it was predicted that managed assets
would "exceed $1 trillion" within five to ten years. See SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS vii-xi (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
See James Mackintosh, Markets and Investing: Moody's Labels Activists a Threat to Credit
288.
Quality, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2007.
See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 103, at 1476-77. One practicing corporate lawyer back289.
handedly agreed, bemoaning hedge funds' facilitation of hostile takeovers, but advocating a remedy
involving development and communication of "the best possible strategic plan to increase long-term
value for shareholders"-which he concedes "companies should be doing . . . as a business matter
anyhow." Schnell, supra note 103, at S1, S4-S5.
290.
See Mackintosh, supra note 288.
Strine, supra note 213, at 5, 7; see also Anabtawi, supra note 115, at 583; Schnell, supra note
291.
103, at S1, S4; Stout, supra note 92, at 794-95.
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In evaluating all of this, however-and notably its impact on the analysis of the public corporation set out above-it is important to examine the
actual mechanisms by which activist shareholders, like pension funds and
hedge funds, bring pressure to bear on corporate management. Indeed,
that management pay attention to the activists at all is perhaps curious in
light of the fact that activists typically do not take majority stakes 2" and
that shareholder proposals virtually never garner many votes at the ballot
box.293 The real power of activist shareholders would appear to lie in publicity, and the indirect benefits this brings them in influencing management. As the Social Investment Forum has observed, "[u]nlike in electoral
politics, success in proxy voting is not measured solely through winning a
majority vote. , 294 Particularly in light of rational apathy and the tendency
of some institutions "automatically [to] vote with management on shareholder proposals," management may interpret "even modest support for
shareholder resolutions" as indicative of "genuine interest among shareholders, stakeholders, the public and the press," which "is often enough to
compel management to enter into dialogue and to consider changing its
practices and policies. 295 Indeed, for these reasons, many proposals can
simply be withdrawn before any vote is even held.296 Independent directors-upon whom we place increased regulatory reliance in the post-Enron
world,29 7 and who "derive important elements of their net worth from
board service"-are particularly susceptible to activist pressure to give in
to their demands in order to avoid a damaging "withhold authority" campaign in the next board election.298
As observed above, the use of ethical screens by "socially responsible
investors" has fallen over recent years "as single issue screening has
waned and shareholder advocacy increased on the part of institutional investors." 299 The Social Investment Forum attributes this development in
part to convergence of the interests of "socially responsible investors" and
"more traditional corporate-governance advocates," as "major institutional
investors" like public pension funds "have increasingly come to recognize
the potential impact of social, environmental, and ethical issues on longterm shareholder value. " °°
" As described above, however, empowerment
of and activism by long-term oriented investors cannot easily be had without simultaneously empowering those ruthlessly focused on the short-term;
292.
See Schnell, supra note 103, at S4.
293.
See Lee, supra note 94, at 63.
294.
SOC. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at 18.
295.
Id. at 18; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text (observing that some anticipate a
reinvigoration of the market for corporate control due to increasing institutional activism).
296.
SOC. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at 21-22.
297.
Bruner, supranote 143, at 1131-32.
298.
Strine, supra note 213, at 8, 11-12.
299.
SOC. INV. FORUM, supra note 240, at v, fig.B, n.1, 11-12.
300.
Id. at 16.
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after all, they are all shareholders, and as such this is a setting in which
the sun truly shines, and the rain falls, on the good and the bad alike.
To return, then, to the issue with which this part of the Article is concerned: it would appear that, to date, the rise of institutional shareholders
has not greatly increased the likelihood that individual retail investors will
bring their own conceptions of the social good to bear on corporate management (via socially responsible investing), but has enhanced certain institutions' ability to pursue their own interests by boosting short-term returns (via institutional activism)."' In this light, the rise of institutional
shareholders has only reinforced the dynamics discussed above and heightened the stakes of the corporate governance debate.
V. SHAREHOLDERS' BYLAW POWER AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW

The analysis presented above suggests that corporate law, for lack of a
single animating vision of the social good, has refrained from articulating
a clear hierarchy of beneficiaries of corporate production or fully endorsing the claims to corporate governance authority and legitimacy of either
of its principal power constituencies. I conclude by observing briefly that
corporate law's fundamental ambivalence ought to affect how we think
about current doctrinal debates reflecting such dynamics-notably the debate over the scope of shareholders' bylaw authority, which brings corporate law's ambivalence to the foreground and cuts to the very heart of corporate governance.
The corporate governance debate has seen various proposals for reform arise over recent years-many requiring relatively fundamental
changes to the statutory default rules governing the shareholder franchise.3 2 The dynamics discussed in this Article suggest that the prospects
for such reform are doubtful-at least in Delaware-and that the risks
posed by excessively tilting the playing field to the benefit of short-term
investors like hedge funds are very real. Recall that the ambivalence of
Delaware corporate law is, first and foremost, a reflection of the fact that
the legislature itself has never clearly established the primacy of either
power constituency or any particular hierarchy of beneficiaries. I have
argued that this state of affairs is inevitable given the complexities of public corporations. But in any event, as has long been recognized, the Delaware legislature has traditionally remained very cautious indeed when it
301. See Allen, supra note 2, at 279-80 (associating institutional investors with a push for shareholder-centric corporate governance).
302. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 1097-1100 (floating a "thought experiment" involving triennial board elections to insulate directors from short-term pressures in exchange
for "opening up the company's proxy machinery to all nominees having the support of a significant
block of stock"); Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 694-711 (advocating various reforms along these lines).
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comes to fundamental reform.3 °3 Thus in the near term we are likely left
with the status quo-which, by the way, may not be such a bad thing.
Former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Norman Veasey, for
example, observing that neither the shareholder-centrists nor the boardcentrists are "fully satisfied" with the present state of the doctrine, has
suggested that perhaps this means something approximating an appropriate
balance has been struck. "Maybe that is good," he suggests, "like a settlement where there are no clear-cut winners or losers. "34 It would appear
that shareholder advocates (particularly following Enron and other scandals) fear shirking and the extraction of private benefits by boards just as

much as board advocates (and other corporate stakeholders, including
long-term investors) fear increasingly potent hedge fund activism aimed at
maximizing short-term returns. 3 5 Each power constituency believing the
other is too powerful may itself simply be an inevitable reflection of corporate law's fundamental ambivalence-which, in the current political
environment, has taken the form of a high degree of distrust of both agendas. 3" This is particularly likely to remain the case to the extent that we
303.
See, e.g., Lewis S. Black, Jr., A National Law of Takeovers Evolves in Delaware, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1985, at 6 ("The national prominence of its corporation law is a source of pride (and
revenue) to Delaware, and Delaware lawyers, judges, and legislators work to maintain the law's
importance. The Delaware legislature considers proposed improvements from lawyers all over the
country. The statute is fine-tuned frequently, but its clarity and predictability are carefully guarded.
Major changes in direction are rare."); see also Veasey, supra note 209, at 1016 (observing that "as
far as Delaware legislative activity is concerned, the general assembly is usually in a minimalist mode"
in the area of takeovers, "largely because the Delaware Bar (consisting of advocates for both stockholders and directors) is in that mode").
304.
Veasey, supra note 209, at 1015; see also id. at 1011-12 (taking the view of Delaware's
takeover jurisprudence that Winston Churchill took of democracy-i.e., that it "may be inadequateexcept when compared to all the alternatives"); cf. Schnell, supra note 103, at S1, S4-S5 (arguing that
the best way for corporate boards and management to resist hedge fund pressures is to articulate compelling long-term business plans early and often). An interesting reflection of the dynamic identified by
Veasey emerged out of an exchange between scholar J. Robert Brown, who wrote a blog post highlighting the five decisions from 2007 "that most show the anti-shareholder, anti-plaintiff nature of the
Delaware courts," and Delaware practitioner Francis G.X. Pileggi, who responded with a blog post
highlighting five decisions "that demonstrate that the Delaware courts take shareholder rights and the
duties of directors very seriously." Compare J. Robert Brown, Delaware's Top Five Worst Shareholder
Decisions
of
2007,
THERACETOTHEBOTrOM.ORG,
Jan.
3,
2008,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delawares-top-five-worst-shareholderdecisions-of-2007.html, with Francis G.X. Pileggi, In Defense of Delaware CorporateLaw Opinions,
DELAWARE
CORPORATE
AND
COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION
BLOG,
Jan.
4,
2008,
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2008/01/articles/chancery-court-updates/in-defense-of-delawarecorporate-law-opinions/index.html.
305.
Compare Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 678-82, with Schnell, supra note 103, at S1, $4-S5,
Anabtawi, supra note 115, at 579-83, 590-92, and Stout, supra note 92, at 794-95.
306.
See, e.g., Schnell, supra note 103, at S1 (bemoaning the perils of hedge fund activism, though
acknowledging that their impact "may have a lot to do with one of the legacies of the Enron era of
corporate scandals: the development of an environment in which directors and officers operate under a
glare of skepticism, scrutiny and criticism from all directions, including shareholders, analysts, the
media, courts and Congress"). Cf. Allen, supra note 248, at 17-18 (characterizing the contemporary
corporate governance debate as "a contest" between corporate management and institutional investors
"for the trust of the men and women of the country who have accumulated savings," and concluding
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remain unable to predict and preemptively address whatever the next innovation by boards or shareholders may be to consolidate their own power
and pursue private advantage vis-A-vis the corporation as a whole.
With respect to the scope of shareholders' bylaw authority, however,
the nature of the issue differs markedly. The reality is that § 109 already
appears in the DGCL; this is not a question of reform, but of interpreting
and implementing a statutory structure the Delaware legislature has already put in place.3"° As discussed above, the statute thus tees up a perfect
collision between § 141's grant of authority to the board to manage the
"business and affairs" of the corporation and § 109's grant of authority to
the shareholders to unilaterally adopt bylaws "relating to the business of
the corporation" and "the conduct of its affairs"-one that the courts will
inevitably have to sort out.3" 8
This is an issue of enormous significance-both theoretically and practically-as bylaws "are about the only way that shareholders can initiate
binding actions in corporate policy. "3 09 Although a full airing of the issues
lies well beyond the scope of this Article, I would observe that the analysis
of corporate law's fundamental ambivalence provided above strongly supports what I think can fairly be called moderate interpretations of § 109's
scope, such as that advanced by Brett McDonnell.3 1° As McDonnell succinctly observes, there are three possible readings of the two provisions'
interaction.311 Either (1) § 141 always beats § 109, precluding bylaws from
treading in any way upon the board's governance authority; (2) § 109 always beats § 141, in which case the shareholders' ability to carve back
unilaterally1 2 at the board's governance authority knows no bounds; or (3)
"one can split the difference so that section 109(b) does allow for some
limitations on matters that otherwise would be subject to board authority,
313
but section 141(a) limits how far such bylaw provisions can go."
McDonnell cites as principal support for the third reading (among other
things) the canon of statutory construction that "we should read different
that "some balance of power" is desirable); Johnson, supra note 160, at 906-07 (arguing that nonshareholder constituencies' interests do not fit comfortably into the "binary world of corporate doctrine" in which shareholders and managers remain "the only two mainstays in the corporate-law
world").
307.
See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, ShareholderNominations, and Poison Pills, 3
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 205, 207 (2005) (observing that this basic collision of board and shareholder
authority appears in every state's statute).
308.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(a), 141(a) (2001).
309.
McDonnell, supra note 307, at 210.
310.
See id. at 263-64 ("[A]n expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to enact bylaws is both plausible under Delaware's statutory scheme and desirable as a policy matter.").
311.
Id. at 214.
312.
Recall that while shareholders can unilaterally adopt bylaws under § 109, amendments to the
certificate of incorporation under § 242(b) must be proposed by the board and approved by shareholders.
313.
McDonnell, supra note 307, at 214.
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statutes together harmoniously, such that effect is given to all provisions "3 14 -an eminently sensible approach ensuring that each of §§ 141
and 109 actually means something in reality. I would emphasize, however,
that such a reading is substantially strengthened by the analysis of corporate law's larger structure provided above, indicating that corporate law in
its essence reflects our historical unwillingness to grant complete control
over the wheels of corporate governance to either power constituency
alone-as either of the alternative modes of reading the statute would tend
to do.
Commentators have voiced radically different views on the matter. Indeed, "[m]ost of the leading Delaware firms have opined that a mandatory
bylaw would constitute an invalid intrusion by the shareholders into the
realm protected by § 141(a),"" 5 and Lawrence Hamermesh has argued
that "it is preferable to read section 141(a) as an absolute preclusion
against by-law limits on director management authority, in the absence of
explicit statutory authority for such limits outside of section 109(b)"notably to avoid the thorny judicial line-drawing problems that otherwise
inevitably arise.31 6 Yet even the most elemental issues regarding the relationship between §§ 141 and 109 remain to be settled by Delaware's
courts.317 From a practical standpoint, the most important questions relate
to bylaws restricting the boards' powers with respect to poison pills, and
bylaws mandating that shareholder nominees for board positions be included in the corporation's proxy materials under specific circumstances

(notably where the shareholder meets certain ownership criteria). McDon314.
Id.
ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 623; see also The Bebchuk Bylaw:
315.
Devilish... but brilliant [hereinafter Bebchuk Bylaw], 6:10 M&A J. 1, 4-8 (2006).
Hamermesh, supra note 200, at 444. As a matter of statutory interpretation, Hamermesh
316.
argues that "[w]hen section 141(a) refers to limitations on board authority 'provided in this chapter,' it
does not refer to all by-laws that could conceivably be adopted pursuant to the general authority conferred by section 109(b)," but rather "is more naturally read to refer to statutes which address its
specific subject matter-the allocation of managerial power to the board of directors-and which
clearly and explicitly depart from that allocation by providing for management by persons other than
directors." Id. at 430-31.
317.
In July 2008, as this Article went to press, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion
addressing two questions of law on certification from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(pursuant to a provision of the Delaware Constitution permitting such certification): (1) whether a
proposed bylaw requiring reimbursement of proxy expenses under certain circumstances was "a
proper subject for action by shareholders," and (2) whether the bylaw, if adopted, would cause the
corporation, CA, "to violate any Delaware law to which it is subject." CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, No. 329, 2008 at 2-4 (Del. July 17, 2008). The court rejected the notion that
.any bylaw that in any respect might be viewed as limiting or restricting the power of the board of
directors automatically falls outside the scope of permissible bylaws," and found that while there is no
"bright line" indicating which bylaws may be unilaterally adopted by shareholders, the bylaw at issue
was sufficiently focused on procedure to be a proper subject for shareholder action. Id. at 10-18. On
the second question, however, the court found that the bylaw would cause CA to violate Delaware law
because it could force the board to reimburse proxy expenses in violation of the board's fiduciary
duties (e.g. "where the proxy contest is motivated by personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those of the corporation"). Id. at 18-24.
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nell argues that both should be permitted, though he concedes that proxy
access bylaws are the more straightforward in that, among other things, no
statutory provisions explicitly address proxy access, whereas the DGCL
explicitly places the regulation of stock rights (the mechanism of the poison pill) within the certificate of incorporation."'
To date, these questions have yet to reach the Delaware courts in a
justiciable form, but some clues regarding the courts' potential views nevertheless have emerged. In 2006 Lucian Bebchuk sought a declaratory

judgment regarding the validity of a bylaw he proposed as shareholder of
CA, Inc., which would have required that, in the absence of shareholder
ratification, the board could adopt a poison pill or amend it to extend its
term only by unanimous vote, and that the pill would automatically expire

within one year of any such action.319 The proposed bylaw could be repealed by the board, but again only by unanimous vote.3 20 Because the

case was "not yet ripe for consideration" (the bylaw not having been
adopted by the shareholders), the court refused to rule and denied the request for declaratory relief,3 21 but in so doing the court provided some
tantalizing hints as to how it might assess a challenge to an enacted bylaw
of this sort. Observing that its "review of the divergent authorities concerning the validity of stockholder bylaws which limit a board of director's exercise of one of its powers" showed the issue to be "fraught with
tension," the court added that

[flrom a purely legal standpoint, it is not necessarily clear that a
bylaw limiting the duration of a board-authorized rights plan to
one year is either facially illegal as an unauthorized impingement

upon the board's powers under the DGCL or an unreasonable intrusion into the board's exercise of its fiduciary duties.322

318.
See McDonnell, supra note 307, at 223-25.
319.
Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738-39 (Del. Ch. 2006).
320.
Id. Note that under DGCL § 109(a), the board can be given the power in the certificate of
incorporation (and thus by the shareholders, incidentally) to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws as well.
This raises another thorny question regarding the ability of the board to repeal shareholder-adopted
bylaws aimed at curtailing the board's power. See id. at 743; Hamermesh, supra note 200, at 469-75.
321.
CA, Inc., 902 A.2d at 738. Ultimately the bylaw garnered 41% of the vote. ALLEN,
KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 17, at 624.
322.
CA, Inc., 902 A.2d at 742-43; cf. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 205, at *22-33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (rejecting arguments that contractual limitation of the
board's ability to extend a poison pill beyond one year without shareholder approval constituted an
unenforceable limitation on the board's § 141 authority or curtailment of the board's capacity to discharge its fiduciary duties). In the oral argument CA focused on the one-year limit, but did not contest
the unanimity requirement in light of § 141(b)'s explicit provision for a bylaw requiring greater than a
majority vote for board action. See Bebchuk Bylaw, supra note 315, at 10. Lawrence Hamermesh took
the view that "[tihis is far more defensible than anything we've seen before," but that "[limiting the
duration of the unanimously board-adopted pill to one year is where the proposal probably overreaches." Id. at 1, 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Put differently, the court appears open to the possibility that action
squarely within the board's authority under the DGCL could be limited by
a shareholder-enacted bylaw, though not to an unlimited degree323
signaling a desire to pursue a balanced approach ensuring that both §§ 141
be brought to bear on the "business" and "affairs" of the corand 109 can
24
poration.

Stephen Bainbridge has likened the search for "pure" theories of corporate governance to the search for a "unified field theory" in physics,
and concluded that physicists' failure to identify any such theory "provides
a strong cautionary tale for anyone seeking a unified field theory of social
interactions among fallible humans, whose behavior is far harder to predict than is that of, say, an electron. 3 25 Thus even proponents of "pure"

board-centric or shareholder-centric conceptions of corporate governance
like Bainbridge may concede that the explanatory domain of any such theory is inevitably limited. "But so what?" he asks. "Elegant and parsimoni-

ous models are more important for economists than for lawyers. Instead,
situation-specific mini-theories often are more useful for making legal decisions than a single unified theory. "326

To be clear, my claim is not that a descriptive theory identifying a certain form of "ambivalence" as the core characteristic of corporate law
permits us to predict any specific exercise of judicial line-drawing in this
area. The description of corporate law's ambivalence in this Article seeks
above all else to depict accurately corporate law's full complexity-a complexity that belies the sort of easy predictive correspondence between theory and future practice that might be available were any of the prevailing
theories outlined above more descriptively compelling than they are. Yet,
while I readily grant that "situation-specific mini-theories" may "often"
323.
See Bebchuk Bylaw, supra note 315, at 14. Note that the court also emphasized the importance
of the specific "factual context" of a given case, and added that "[hiere, it is useful to remember, the
proposed bylaw would allow the CA board to amend or repeal it by a unanimous vote." CA, Inc., 902
A.2d at 742-43. Jeffrey Gordon has argued that the line should be drawn between bylaws reflecting
shareholders' "residual" governance authority, which ought to be permitted, and those interfering with
"discrete business decision[s]," which ought not to be permitted. Gordon, supra note 81, at 549-50
(arguing that shareholders should be permitted to adopt bylaws that "establish a shareholder mechanism as a precondition for the effectiveness of a pill, or for the amendment, repeal or waiver of an
already existing pill"; that "forbid the creation of a pill altogether, or limit its possible terms ... or
prescribe conditions under which a pill could be implemented"; and that "force redemption of an
already existing poison pill or amendment of its terms, except in connection with a specific transaction"). See also supra note 317.
324.
Cf. Bebchuk Bylaw, supra note 315, at 14 (quoting an "experienced interpreter of [Delaware's] state courts," suggesting that "Delaware doesn't like bright lines," and that "when things get
complicated they default back to the notion of whether it's reasonable" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
325.
Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 1628. A unified field theory "would provide a single set of
simple laws that explain the four interactions or forces that affect matter-i.e., the strong, electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational forces." Id.
326.
Bainbridge, supranote 78 (responding to the SSRN working paper version of this Article).
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serve, they most definitely will not serve in all instances. Crucially, the
issues demanding a more holistic view of corporate law as a field will, I
believe, tend to be those in which the stakes are highest. Such is the case
in delineating the scope of the shareholders' bylaw authority, which-as
we have seen-presents a clash of absolute and irreconcilable values at the
very heart of corporate governance, with no guidance from the legislature
as to how courts ought to resolve it.
327
The upshot of my analysis is that some form of balancing of the cor-

poration's power constituencies is inevitable if we are to remain consistent
in this specific area with corporate law's larger structure-and correlatively, that the principal alternative position entirely subordinating shareholders' bylaw power to the board's management authority would sharply
deviate from that larger structure. Although fundamental contours of this
area of corporate law remain to be developed, there is at least some intimation that Delaware courts will remain cognizant of and consistent with
corporate law's refusal to permit either power constituency entirely to
dominate governance of the corporationa8-a long-standing approach to
corporate governance that I have argued is rooted in the fundamental nature and dynamics of the corporate structure itself.
VI. CONCLUSION

In assessing debates regarding the social merits of industrialism, John
Stuart Mill wrote in 1840 "that the besetting danger is not so much of em-

bracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking part of the truth for the
whole."329 We might observe the same of contemporary corporate governance debates, which are no less complex or politically contentious.33 ° Indeed, the latter are no more likely to produce broadly satisfactory resolu327.
Cf. Gordon, supra note 81, at 547 ("The Delaware court needs a theory to explain the appropriate boundary between shareholder power and the board's authority-a theory presumably richer in
normative appeal than 'management wins.'"); Thompson & Smith, supra note 81, at 319-23 (citing
Gordon and concluding that "the plain words of the statute are too contradictory to be interpreted
without employing external policy considerations").
328.
It should be observed that these issues are closely bound up with issues arising under SEC
Rule 14a-8, governing shareholder access to public corporations' proxy statements-notably because
the rule permits management to exclude a shareholder proposal when, among other things, it is
deemed "not a proper subject for action by shareholders" under state law, it "deals with a matter
relating to the company's ordinary business operations," or it relates to an election. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(i) (2007). For analysis of these issues, see McDonnell, supra note 307, at 252-64, and
Bebchuk, supra note 74, at 707-09. For a nuanced history of the evolution of Rule 14a-8, itself reflecting ambivalence about the merits of shareholder versus board authority, see Mitchell, supra note 25, at
1551-60.
329.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 216, at 50 (quoting Mill); cf. Baird & Henderson, supra note 172,
at 1 ("Legal principles that are almost right are often more mischievous than those that are completely
wrong."). For an argument that Mill himself sought to work out a "humanized utilitarianism," see
WILLIAMS, supra note 216, at 49-70.
330.
See supra note 213.
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tions than the former because, as we have seen, the latter are themselves
nothing other than reflections of the former.
Corporate law's ambivalence regarding power constituencies, regarding beneficiaries, and regarding the achievement of the social good, each
reflect larger misgivings about the consistency of shareholders' interests
and incentives with those of society at large. As then-Chancellor Allen
suggested, "[i]t is perhaps asking too much to expect us as a people-or
our law-to have a single view of the purpose of an institution so large,
pervasive, and important as our public corporations." 331 Though surely
right, I would add that, given the abuses to which excessive control by
either power constituency can give rise, and our inability to ascribe to
either of them a stronger identification with the social good, corporate
law's ambivalence toward them may well represent a keen self-awareness
and, as such, reflect its healthiest attribute.332 We would do well to ensure
that it remains its most enduring.

331.
Allen, supra note 2, at 280; see also Orts, supra note 13, at 1612-23.
332.
Cf. Allen, supra note 248, at 17-18 (advocating "some balance of power" between corporate
management and institutional investors and urging "modesty and caution in making changes to facilitate one group or the other").

